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Corporations are required to disclose specific types of information to the 
public, but only the federal securities laws impose generalized disclosure 
obligations that produce a holistic overview of corporate operations. While 
these disclosures are intended to benefit investors, they are accessible to 
anyone, and thus have long been relied upon by regulators, competitors, 
employees, and local communities to provide a working portrait of the 
country’s economic life. 
Today, that system is breaking down. Congress and the SEC have made it 
easier for companies to raise capital without triggering securities reporting 
obligations, allowing modern businesses to grow to enormous proportions 
while leaving the public in the dark about their operations. Meanwhile, 
investors’ governmentally conferred informational advantage allows them to 
tilt managers’ behavior in their favor, at the expense of consumers, employees, 
and other corporate stakeholders. As a result, securities disclosures do not 
provide the comprehensive picture necessary to maintain social control over 
corporate behavior. 
This Article recommends that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
disclosure for noninvestor audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a 
disclosure system geared to their interests. In so doing, this Article excavates 
the historical pedigree of proposals for stakeholder-oriented disclosure. Both 
in the Progressive Era, and again during the 1970s, efforts to create 
generalized corporate disclosure obligations were commonplace. In each era, 
however, they were redirected towards investor audiences, in the expectation 
that investors would serve as a proxy for the broader society. As this Article 
establishes, that compromise is no longer tenable. 
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Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.  
     – Louis D. Brandeis1 
Introduction 
The corporate form confers upon its organizers the ability to aggregate 
tremendous amounts of wealth while limiting the liability of investors for any 
harms that the corporation inflicts. As a result, one of the great corporate law 
challenges has been to develop regulatory systems that enable the productive 
use of the form while ensuring that corporate wealth and power are channeled 
in a prosocial direction. These systems exist, most obviously, in the web of 
substantive regulations that mandate or prohibit certain types of corporate 
conduct, and, less obviously, in the legal rules that govern the corporate 
structure itself. 
Yet legal rules are necessarily imperfect. Regulators cannot identify every 
area that requires intervention; not every instance of corporate lawbreaking can 
be the subject of a lawsuit; and it is not practical to outlaw all unethical 
corporate activity. But where the law cannot go, markets impose their own 
constraints. We expect that consumers will refuse to buy dangerous and 
defective products, workers will avoid firms that pay inadequate wages, and 
creditors will deny loans to firms that default on their debts. Firms that develop 
reputations for unsavory business practices may be shunned by communities 
where they hope to operate, or governments that purchase services.2 These 
reputational markets then make legal systems more effective. Firms that 
develop reputations for unsavory business practices may attract scrutiny from 
regulators, inspiring more precise legal prohibitions or greater enforcement 
efforts. In the end, fear of societal approbation motivates managers to adopt 
prosocial business practices from the outset. 
The catch, as this Article highlights, is that these markets for corporate 
social responsibility require a certain baseline level of transparency. Public 
disclosures by corporations can expose antisocial practices (which may then be 
the subject of protest), permit employees to compare working conditions and 
wage data, and allow competitors to identify monopoly rents and opportunities 
for innovation. Corporate secrecy, by contrast, permits antisocial practices to 
thrive.  
Outside of the United States, this principle is understood and incorporated 
into the regulatory framework. In Europe, for example, all limited liability 
 
1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
2. Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. 
L. REV. 1193, 1208 (2019). 
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companies must make annual disclosures about their operations and finances.3 
A new European Union directive mandates that certain large companies 
regularly disclose information pertaining to their environmental impact, 
employee relationships, respect for human rights, and anticorruption measures, 
in order to “meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders [and] to provide 
consumers with easy access to information on the impact of businesses on 
society.”4 
In this country, however, the situation is far different. Here, the only 
regulator that requires comprehensive corporate disclosure is the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Whenever a company seeks to raise capital 
through the public sale of securities, the SEC requires that it file a detailed 
description of its business and financial condition, periodically updated with 
new information about its profits, revenues, assets, and general business 
activities. Regulators, competitors, employees, journalists, and members of the 
community have all grown to depend on securities disclosures to provide a 
working portrait of the country’s economic life. Yet securities disclosures are 
not targeted toward the community at large; they are intended for investors 
alone, and when investors do not require disclosure, the general public is kept 
in the dark. In the United States, then, corporate transparency is a function of 
the needs of the investing class. 
As this Article demonstrates, America’s peculiar system of tying 
generalized disclosure requirements exclusively to public investment is the 
result of a series of historical compromises. Both in the Progressive Era, and 
again during the 1970s, activists, scholars, and politicians sought to enact 
corporate disclosure schemes in order to make businesses more accountable to 
society at large. Each time, these efforts were redirected toward investor 
audiences, in the expectation that investors could serve as a proxy for the 
broader society. 
It is now evident that the compromise carried with it the seeds of its own 
destruction. Both Congress and the SEC have concluded that the giant 
institutional investors who dominate contemporary markets require fewer 
 
3. The amount of disclosure required depends on the size of the company. See Darren Bernard 
et al., Size Management by European Private Firms to Minimize Proprietary Costs of Disclosure, 66 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 94, 96-98 (2018). Additionally, some countries make tax returns public to a greater or 
lesser extent. Alister Doyle & Alistair Scrutton, Privacy, What Privacy? Many Nordic Tax Records Are 
a Phone Call Away, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-tax-nordics-
idUSKCN0X91QE [https://perma.cc/M6SN-6QWW]; Jeffrey L. Hoopes et al., Public Tax-Return 
Disclosure (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24318, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24318 [https://perma.cc/VP9Y-G5P5]. 
4. Directive 2014/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity Information by 
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups [hereinafter Directive 2014]. The United Kingdom has also 
recently required that all large firms disclose certain details regarding their governance arrangements. 
See The Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/860 (UK); see also Paul 
Hodgson, FRC Issues Corporate Governance Principles for Private Companies, COMPLIANCE WEEK 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.complianceweek.com/frc-issues-corporate-governance-principles-for-
private-companies/24962.article [https://perma.cc/83VE-D45U]. 
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regulatory protections, and they have concomitantly made it easier for issuers 
to raise capital without becoming subject to mandatory disclosure 
requirements. The result is that modern businesses can grow to enormous 
proportions while shielding the details of their operations from public scrutiny. 
At the same time, the fact that corporations have generalized disclosure 
obligations only to investor audiences elevates investors over other 
constituencies as the central object of corporate concern. Even if the public 
demands information about firms’ environmental impact, their treatment of 
workers, their political activity, and their use of customer data, corporations are 
under no obligation to provide it absent a showing of relevance to an investor 
audience. Investors can then use their informational advantage to influence 
business decisions, while other stakeholders are left weakened and unprotected. 
The asymmetry leads to new demands for corporate accountability to 
noninvestor constituencies. 
In response to this reality, most scholars have recommended that we 
tweak our securities laws,5 often by expanding disclosures geared toward 
investor audiences.6 But to do so would only exacerbate the problem by 
centering investors even further. Thus, this Article takes a different approach. 
Rather than assume that a disclosure system designed for investor audiences 
can continue to serve the needs of the general public, this Article recommends 
that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of disclosure for noninvestor 
audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a disclosure system geared to 
their interests. 
The aim of this Article is to revitalize a conversation that has long been 
neglected. The assumption—stated or unstated—that all public disclosure must 
necessarily run through the securities laws has distorted the discourse for 
decades. Academics, regulators, and advocates have conflated the interests of 
investor and stakeholder audiences, to the detriment of both. There has been 
little, if any, discussion of the informational needs of the general public, or 
when and whether businesses should operate under a duty of public 
transparency. At the same time, advocates for myriad causes try to flood the 
securities disclosure system with information relevant to their own 
idiosyncratic interests, overburdening the SEC and making it more difficult for 
investor audiences to interpret the information they are given. 
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part I describes the functions of 
mandatory corporate disclosure for both investor and noninvestor audiences. 
Part II contrasts the informational needs of investors with the informational 
 
5. George Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities 
Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 663 (2017); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 375 
(2013). 
6. Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure in the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 583, 609 (2016); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1289 (1999). 
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needs of the public. Part III describes the history of proposals for stakeholder-
oriented disclosure, and demonstrates how those proposals were redirected into 
investor-oriented disclosure regimes. Part IV describes the detrimental effects 
of relying on investor-oriented disclosure to serve the needs of the general 
public. Part V sketches out how a stakeholder-oriented disclosure system might 
be designed today, with a view toward ensuring that all large companies—even 
nominally “private” ones—operate with a basic level of transparency. Part VI 
concludes. 
I. The Functions of Corporate Disclosure 
Corporations occupy a peculiar position in our polity. Launched, financed, 
and operated by nongovernmental actors, they are not public in the traditional 
sense. Yet they are not quite private, either: They owe their very existence to 
the grant of a state charter, and, due to their size and power, they may impact 
the lives of thousands or even millions of people. The corporate form is both 
necessary and desirable for economic development, but the limited liability that 
it offers to investors, coupled with its ability to aggregate vast amounts of 
capital, creates the potential to inflict enormous harm on society.7 As a result, 
since the rise of the great corporations in the late nineteenth century, 
commenters have debated whether the fundamental purpose of the business 
corporation is to maximize the wealth of its investors, or whether instead it 
should be run with a view toward benefitting all “stakeholders” who are 
affected by corporate activity.8 
This debate is in many ways misleading. No one disputes that 
corporations “should be organized and operated to serve the interests of society 
as a whole,” 9 or that corporate managers should strive to earn returns for their 
investors while adhering to basic tenets of social responsibility, such as paying 
taxes due, protecting consumers, providing safe workspaces, and minimizing 
harm to the environment. The real areas of disagreement concern how legal 
institutions should be arranged to best bring about these results. 
Under the current regime, corporate managers operate under fiduciary 
duties to further the interests of shareholders.10 That alone raises the ire of 
many commentators,11 but, in reality, fiduciary duties are so rarely enforced 
 
7. LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 49-65 
(2003) (describing the corporate form as an “externalizing machine”). 
8. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist 
Origins, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 143 (2008). 
9. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 441 (2001). 
10. The precise nature of managers’ fiduciary duties is subject to debate, but most 
commentators would agree that managers must pursue shareholder interests. Id. at 443. 
11. Id. at 447. 
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that they likely play little role in how corporations are managed.12 Instead, the 
true driver of corporate decision making is the incentive structure in which it is 
embedded. Shareholders vote for directors—which permits them to oust those 
who do not pursue their interests with sufficient vigor—and corporate 
managers are compensated with pay packages that are designed to align their 
interests with shareholders.13 These features of the corporate form provide 
managers with powerful incentives to maximize wealth of investors, even at the 
expense of other groups with whom the corporation interacts.14 
Yet managers also have incentives to consider nonshareholder 
constituencies. Environmental law, antitrust law, consumer protection law, 
antidiscrimination law, labor law, and the like, all force managers to account 
for the impact of corporate activity on society as a whole. These laws may 
penalize managers directly for lack of compliance,15 and in that respect 
function as a counterweight to incentives to act in shareholders’ interests. More 
commonly, penalties are imposed on corporations themselves,16 threatening to 
cut into corporate profits and ultimately diminish shareholder wealth. As a 
result, managers are incentivized to accommodate nonshareholder 
constituencies as part of their general mandate to act on shareholders’ behalf. 
In recent years, there has been growing dissatisfaction with this balance, 
largely due to concerns that the regulatory system is inadequate to constrain the 
negative externalities associated with corporate conduct.17 Corporations that 
operate internationally may evade control by any single government; corporate 
complexity may tax the limited resources of regulators; corporate lobbyists 
may sap political will for vigorous oversight. More broadly, there is general 
recognition that it is simply inappropriate to rely solely on legal prohibitions to 
curb all antisocial corporate activity, because it is impossible to specify in 
advance—let alone enforce laws against—every potential form of corporate 
misbehavior. Just as we expect that natural persons will comply with social 
norms without imposing legal mandates that they do so in every respect, it is 
 
12. David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 223 
(2013). 
13. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1530-31 (2007). 
14. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence from 
My Hometown, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 176 (2017) (explaining that shareholders’ power within 
the corporate form ensures that managers will elevate their interests over the interests of other 
constituencies). 
15. See, e.g., Former CEO of Volkswagen AG Charged with Conspiracy and Wire Fraud in 
Diesel Emissions Scandal, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (May 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-
ceo-volkswagen-ag-charged-conspiracy-and-wire-fraud-diesel-emissions-scandal 
[https://perma.cc/587X-H5NS]. 
16. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Pleads Guilty to Federal Environmental Crimes, Admits Civil 
Violations and Will Pay More Than $81 Million, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wal-mart-pleads-guilty-federal-environmental-crimes-admits-civil-
violations-and-will-pay-more [https://perma.cc/EG9X-QJ3R]. 
17. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 16-21 (2006); DAVID 
YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION 31-34 (2018). 
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hoped that corporations, as well, will adhere to certain baseline standards of 
ethical behavior even absent threat of formal legal penalty.18 But if corporate 
managers are incentivized to pursue shareholder wealth maximization and 
constrained only by what the law prohibits, corporations will violate these 
norms. 
In this state of affairs, markets, both economic and social, fill the spaces 
that law cannot reach.19 In order to earn profits, corporations not only have to 
produce goods and services that attract customers, but they also must generate 
enough reputational capital to maintain relationships with suppliers, employees, 
and other critical stakeholders.20 Corporations that develop poor reputations—
for creating harmful products, for mistreating their workforce, for overcharging 
clients—will find it more difficult to operate.21 Journalists will spotlight their 
behavior; consumers avoid them; investors and other suppliers of capital will 
flee; and competitors will challenge their position. Regardless of whether 
managers are expected—via fiduciary duties or otherwise—to maximize 
shareholder wealth, an effective system of “soft” corporate discipline ensures 
that the pursuit of shareholder wealth is aligned with the well-being of the 
broader society in which the corporation operates.22 
But, like any market, the market for corporate responsibility requires 
transparency to operate effectively. Corporate stakeholders cannot pressure 
managers to change behaviors of which they are unaware.23 Transparency also 
makes the formal legal system more effective: Corporations that develop 
reputations as “bad actors” may become political targets; corporations with 
better reputations may enjoy a degree of regulatory forbearance.24 Yet, other 
than the federal securities laws, the United States has no general requirement 
that businesses disclose the details of their internal operations. The result is that 
the public is deprived of valuable insights that could be used to exert social 
control over corporate behavior. 
 
18. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
733, 748-53 (2005); Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research 
and Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 988 (2017). 
19. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2006). 
20. Craig Deegan, Introduction: The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental 
Disclosure—A Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282 (2002); Hillary 
A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License (June 20, 2019) (unpublished article), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403706 [https://perma.cc/6H2W-33K5] [hereinafter Social License]. 
21. Hill, supra note 2, at 1208. 
22. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 645 (2006) (describing the view that corporate interests and societal 
interests ultimately converge). 
23. Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value Maximizing? The DuPont Case (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23866, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23866 
[https://perma.cc/KK3Y-6DD2]. 
24. Sale, supra note 20, at 40-41. 
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A. Form and Functions of Securities Disclosure 
Businesses that operate in the United States are constantly required to 
disclose information. Both state and federal law require merchants to disclose 
product and service information to consumers.25 Federal law requires 
employers to disclose workplace hazards to employees.26 Data on the racial and 
gender makeup of a firm’s workforce must be disclosed to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission,27 and detailed financial information 
must be disclosed to the IRS. These disclosures, however, are specific and 
targeted for particular purposes; many are made exclusively to government 
agencies and available to the public, if at all, only through a lengthy and 
difficult FOIA process.28 
There is, however, one regulatory sphere that requires a holistic set of 
disclosures for public consumption: the federal securities laws. Whenever a 
company makes its securities—namely, its stock, or its bonds—available for 
generalized trading, it becomes subject to a host of public disclosure 
requirements. 
There are three paths by which a company becomes “public” and thus 
obligated to disclose information pursuant to the federal securities laws. First, 
the company may directly undertake to sell securities to the public. The 
question whether a sale counts as “public” or “private” is a complex one, but, 
in general, public sales are those made on an unrestricted basis to a dispersed 
set of investors who have no special qualifications or inside information.29 If a 
company chooses to sell its securities in this manner, it must file a publicly 
available registration statement with the SEC and additional reports every 
quarter thereafter,30 with emergency updates on an as-needed basis.31 The 
issuing company must also file a copy of its proxy statement in advance of any 
stockholder meeting.32 
Second, the company may choose to list its securities for trading on a 
national exchange. Typically, an exchange listing is accompanied by a public 
sale of securities but not always; for example, the company may sell small 
amounts of securities privately over a prolonged period and later decide to 
 
25. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (2018); Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (2016); 21 
C.F.R. pt. 801 (2019); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 653-62 (2011). 
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2019). 
27. Id. § 1602.7. 
28. See, e.g., Jamillah Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1684, 1688 
(2019). See generally David Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (2017) (describing FOIA’s procedural obstacles). 
29. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, § 78o (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-13 (2019). 
31. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2019). 
32. Id. §§ 240.14a-6, 240.14a-101. 
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make those securities available on an exchange.33 Once it does so, it, too, 
becomes obligated to file a standard package of operational and financial 
disclosures with the SEC—where they can be accessed by the general public—
and to file quarterly updates and proxy statements.34 
Third, a company may become subject to federal disclosure requirements 
if a certain number of its securities has generally fallen into public hands, even 
without a formal public offering.35 This might occur if, again, the company 
sells securities privately over a prolonged period and a large enough segment of 
the public ends up holding its stock or bonds. 
Whatever path the company takes to becoming “public,” once it does so, 
it remains subject to the securities disclosure regime, at least so long as the 
triggering securities remain in public hands.36 Among other matters, these 
companies must provide detailed information about cash flows;37 assets;38 
capital structure;39 trends likely to affect liquidity, profits, and capital 
resources;40 compensation paid to top executives and the objectives of the 
compensation program;41 and a variety of other topics that are, or could be, 
relevant to companies’ future financial performance and, thus, to their 
investors.42 
Though Congress has set forth the general disclosure regime via the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the details of 
these disclosures and the means of their dissemination are mostly governed by 
regulations promulgated by the SEC.43 The SEC’s mandate is to protect 
investors, facilitate capital raising, and encourage the development of healthy 
capital markets,44 and disclosure is a critical (though not the only45) mechanism 
for accomplishing these goals. 
 
33. Marc D. Jaffe et al., Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, 
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 5, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/05/spotify-case-study-structuring-and-executing-a-direct-
listingv [https://perma.cc/85Z2-BVAC]. 
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2019). 
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13. 
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-3 (2019). 
37. Id. § 210.3-02.  
38. Id. §§ 229.301-.302. 
39. Id. § 210.3-01. 
40. Id. § 229.303. 
41. Id. § 229.402. 
42. See generally id. pt. 229 (identifying other aspects of corporate performance that must be 
publicly disclosed under various conditions). 
43. Usha Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435, 456 
(2017). 
44. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/SR9B-U3M5]. Congress has mandated that when the SEC engages in rulemaking, it 
must consider “the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.” National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 
106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (1996). 
45. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 389-92 (1990). 
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Disclosure advances the SEC’s mission in a number of ways. First and 
most fundamentally, it protects investors against fraud.46 Second, disclosure 
allows investors to compare investment opportunities and reward stronger 
businesses with lower costs of capital, resulting in an efficient allocation of 
resources throughout the economy.47 Disclosure also corrects asymmetries of 
information, protecting investors against exploitation by better-informed 
insiders.48 
Finally, disclosure operates to shape the behavior of corporate managers. 
Though the substantive duties owed to investors—the duties of care and 
loyalty—are technically imposed by state law rather than federal law, 
disclosure indirectly assists in the enforcement of these duties. It deters 
managers from engaging in self-dealing and other aggrandizing misconduct,49 
and allows investors to detect, and discipline, such misconduct when it 
occurs.50 Additionally, the obligation to disclose indirectly ensures that 
corporate managers will monitor the business at least sufficiently to gather, 
synthesize, and report the required data.51 
That said, because the securities laws are the only source for holistic 
disclosures about corporate operations, securities disclosures are consumed by 
other corporate stakeholders. Examples abound: Regulators may rely on 
securities disclosures to identify red flags of lawbreaking,52 to gain a general 
understanding of business activity in their sphere of influence,53 and to make 
 
46. See Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 
13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207, 223 (2013). 
47. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984) (“[I]f we view the securities market as the principal allocative 
mechanism for investment capital, the behavior of securities prices is important not so much because of 
their distributive consequences on investors but more because of their effect on allocative efficiency. In 
this light, it is important not only that the game be fair, but that it be accurate—that is, that capital be 
correctly priced.”); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate 
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2544-45 (1997); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential 
Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713-16 (2006). 
48. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 751-52; Guttentag, supra note 46, at 224-27. 
49. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39-40 (3d ed. 2003) (“[A] 
primary enduring mission of the SEC has been to compel disclosure of data by firms involved in the 
securities markets, indirectly inducing these firms to avoid illegal or embarrassing activities.”). 
50. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 753-54; Guttentag, supra note 46, at 227-29; 
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon 
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 873 (2003). 
51. Philip A. Loomis Jr. & Beverly K. Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical 
Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 165-66 (1979); Thompson & Sale, supra note 50, at 873-74. 
52. For example, information disclosed to investors and included in securities filings may 
provide evidence of antitrust violations. Matt Kempner, Airlines Just Can’t Say ‘Buh-Bye’ to Antitrust 
Issues, ATLANTA J. CONST. (July 10, 2015), https://www.ajc.com/news/transportation/airlines-just-can-
say-buh-bye-antitrust-issues/FJqnObBaFDDRmAnarfkCSM [https://perma.cc/AU42-WZEW]; 
Christopher Rowland, Prescription Drug Wholesalers Reaped Windfall from Alleged Price-Fixing, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/prescription-drug-
wholesalers-reaped-windfall-from-alleged-price-fixing/2019/01/31/b8ed6130-230f-11e9-81fd-
b7b05d5bed90_story.html [https://perma.cc/D5SV-58FR]. 
53. Fan, supra note 6, at 599-602. 
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critical policy decisions.54 Employees rely on reported profit margins to strike 
for higher wages.55 Competitors use securities filings to benchmark their own 
financial decisions to others in their industry.56 Lenders use securities filings to 
judge the creditworthiness of potential borrowers.57 Obviously, these effects 
deprive the issuing company of rents, but they also benefit society overall.58 
On a more general level, securities disclosures facilitate social control 
over business activity. Hillary Sale calls this effect “publicness,” namely, the 
process of subjecting corporate power to the same standards of accountability 
that are applied to governmental power.59 Issuers understand that, via securities 
disclosure, they are subject to scrutiny by regulators, journalists, and the 
general public, and conduct themselves accordingly.60 The possibility that 
illegal or unethical behavior will be revealed—exposing the company both to 
legal liability and social opprobrium61—helps deter issuers from engaging in 
such behavior in the first place.62 As a result, securities disclosures ensure 
general compliance with laws that extend well outside the realm of finance, 
protecting both employees and surrounding communities from corporate 
antisocial activity.63 
 
54. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1937-38 
(2013). 
55. Steven Greenhouse, The Return of the Strike, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://prospect.org/article/return-strike [https://perma.cc/VHC2-NYZ9]. A former Ford accountant 
recently explained that the company was concerned that mandated disclosures provided bargaining 
advantages to union members or contracting counterparties. See Nicola M. White, More Detailed U.S. 
Income Statements May Be Elusive Goal, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-accounting/more-detailed-u-s-income-statements-may-be-
elusive-goal [https://perma.cc/C46G-ZT9D]. 
56. Fox, supra note 47, at 2550-51; Georgiev, supra note 5, at 652-53; Sean Cao et al., 
Copycatting and Public Disclosure: Direct Evidence from Peer Companies’ Digital Footprints (Jan. 9, 
2019) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3280744 [https://perma.cc/BP9Z-SHRV]. 
Conversely, when companies lie about their financial results, they may induce competitors to enter 
unprofitable lines of business, potentially creating industry-wide distortions. See Velikonja, supra note 
54. at 1891-92. 
57. See, e.g., U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Fan, 
supra note 6, at 602. After private company WeWork filed the initial paperwork for a public offering of 
its securities, its contracting counterparties became so concerned about its financial stability that they 
began to court its competitors. See Reeves Wiedeman, The Sun Sets on We, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 30, 2019), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/09/what-happened-at-we-why-wework-postponed-its-ipo.html 
[https://perma.cc/62NV-6J9V]. 
58. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 653. 
59. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137-38 
(2011) [hereinafter Sale, New Public]; see also Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 340 (“[W]e 
suspect that some portion of what we call securities regulation follows from an effort to create more 
accountability of large, economically powerful business institutions that is only loosely coupled with 
orthodox (and arguably more measurable) notions of investor protection.”). 
60. Sale, New Public, supra note 59, at 144; see also Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn 
Governance Trap, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 171, 179 (2017). 
61. Hill, supra note 18, at 979. 
62. Jones, supra note 60, at 179. 
63. Id. at 179-82. 
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Yet despite the positive effects of securities disclosure—and those effects 
are among the laws’ purposes64—the mechanism by which those effects are 
achieved is by centering investors: generating information for their 
consumption, and forcing managers to attend to their interests.65 Securities 
disclosures may benefit society at large, but they are not designed with the 
whole of society in mind. 
B. Functions of Disclosure for Noninvestor Audiences 
By providing critical information not only to investors but also to other 
corporate stakeholders, the securities laws have functioned as a proof of 
concept of the broad importance of corporate disclosure. Though there are 
undoubtedly countless possible benefits that flow from corporate transparency, 
in general, these fall into three basic categories. 
1. Contracting and Competition 
Disclosures may benefit a variety of audiences that have financial 
relationships with a corporation. Most obviously, employees and even 
customers can use information about profit margins to drive harder bargains.66 
General information about salaries in a particular field or at a particular 
company—currently very difficult to obtain67—can help all workers negotiate 
for better arrangements, and in particular can help women and people of color 
 
64. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 39-40; Loomis Jr. & Rubman, supra note 51, at 165, 168; 
Adam C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 
841, 846-49 (2009). 
65. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 5 (1934) (“[A]s management became divorced from ownership 
and came under the control of banking groups, men forgot that they were dealing with the savings of 
men and the making of profits became an impersonal thing. When men do not know the victims of their 
aggression they are not always conscious of their wrongs.”); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (“The 
purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business. The basic policy is that of 
informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign 
commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation.”); 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) 
(quoting Roosevelt: “every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be 
accompanied by full publicity and information, and . . . no essentially important element attending the 
issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”); Guttentag, supra note 46, at 212-214; Loomis Jr. & 
Rubman, supra note 51, at 166 (quoting President Roosevelt: “What we seek is a return to a clearer 
understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage . . . corporations . . . handling or using other 
people’s money are trustees acting for others.”); Williams, supra note 6, at 1218 (“The idea of corporate 
powers being held in trust for the shareholders loudly echoes in the legislative history of the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act.”). 
66. Fox, supra note 47, at 2550-51; Georgiev, supra note 5, at 653; Velikonja, supra note 54, 
at 1924-25. 
67. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to 
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2011); Laura M. Holson, Should You Tell the World How 
Much Money You Make?, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/10/business/salary-transparency-ask-a-manager.html 
[https://perma.cc/2K8R-65VJ]. 
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correct for systematic disadvantages they might otherwise experience.68 And 
wages are not the only issue: Disclosure of legal complaints lodged against 
employers (as employees have demanded in the context of sexual harassment69) 
may help vulnerable groups press for better working conditions or, if 
necessary, avoid employers with poor reputations. Merely the act of forcing 
managers to attend to these matters by collecting and publicizing such 
information can prod them to rectify problems that might otherwise have gone 
unnoticed.70 
Disclosure also inspires new forms of entrepreneurship. Jennifer Fan 
points out that when new businesses enter an area, especially if they have 
innovative models, other, auxiliary businesses may adapt to provide support.71 
Disclosure aids these efforts, promoting a more efficient and developed 
economy. 
Finally, disclosure can aid competition. Competing companies may rely 
on information about lines of business, sales figures, and profit margins of their 
peers to make decisions about whether and where to make their own 
investments, and to benchmark their own expenses and sales growth.72 Indeed, 
the argument for light-touch antitrust regulation—trusting that 
supracompetitive profits will attract new entrants73— depends on potential 
competitors becoming aware of those opportunities. 
Sotheby’s, the famous art dealer, provides a timely example. For several 
decades, Sotheby’s was publicly traded, and thus provided investors with 
quarterly financial information. But in 2019, Sotheby’s was sold to a private 
investor, bringing an end to its reporting obligations. When the news was 
 
68. Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 997; Rebecca Greenfield, Making Salary Information Public 
Helps Close the Gender Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-05/making-salary-information-public-helps-close-
the-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/9TFQ-8KEK]; Kristin Wong, Want to Close the Pay Gap? Pay 
Transparency Will Help, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/smarter-
living/pay-wage-gap-salary-secrecy-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/WKD7-8A4N]; Morten 
Bennedsen et al., Do Firms Respond to Gender Pay Gap Transparency? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 25435, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25435 
[https://perma.cc/9B4Y-JA4R]. 
69. Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
351, 364-66, 369-73 (2011) (arguing that disclosure to employees of workplace conditions will help 
them bargain for appropriate employment terms); Jena McGregor, Google and Facebook Ended Forced 
Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims. Why More Companies Could Follow., WASH. POST (Nov. 
12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/google-facebook-ended-forced-
arbitration-sex-harassment-claims-why-more-companies-could-follow [https://perma.cc/Q7D8-9RFS] 
[(describing protests by employees and prospective employees at tech firms and law firms) 
[https://perma.cc/Q7D8-9RFS]. 
70. David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Information Regulation: A Law 
and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 385-86 (2005) (describing the effect in the 
context of environmental reporting); Estlund, supra note 69, at 377 (describing the effect in the context 
of workplace hazards). 
71. Fan, supra note 6, at 602. 
72. See supra Section I.A; see also Bernard et al., supra note 3, at 99. 
73. See George L. Priest, The Abiding Influence of The Antitrust Paradox, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 455, 457 (2008). 
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announced, the entire industry braced for the loss of critical data concerning 
“margins, executive compensation, strategy, capital allocation and the stock’s 
reaction to major economic and political forces.”74 
2. Community Activism and Political Participation 
Illegal, immoral, or unethical behavior can be policed by consumers, 
employees, and other counterparties whose custom is crucial to corporate 
operations. Disclosure is, self-evidently, critical to these initiatives.75 
The most obvious form of social pressure is the customer boycott, or its 
more mild cousin, customer distaste.76 Though many have questioned whether 
boycotts have a genuine effect on sales, there is strong evidence that companies 
are concerned for their reputation and will reform their practices in order to 
avoid negative publicity.77 The mere fact that corporations are willing to 
expend significant resources to do so suggests that negative publicity has a real 
economic impact,78 and, in general, the greater a company’s media visibility, 
the more likely it is to invest in socially responsible measures to maintain its 
reputation.79 The power of social condemnation is only likely to increase: 
 
74. Katya Kazakina et al., Private Deal for Sotheby’s Pushes Art Market ‘Underground’, 
BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-17/billionaire-s-deal-
for-sotheby-s-pushes-art-market-underground [https://perma.cc/JC4J-MAKE]. 
75. Hill, supra note 18, at 979. 
76. See, e.g., Abha Bhattarai, ‘A Tipping Point in Fast Fashion’: Forever 21’s Bankruptcy 
Signals the Shifting Priorities of Young Shoppers, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/03/tipping-point-fast-fashion-forever-s-bankruptcy-
signals-shifting-priorities-young-shoppers [https://perma.cc/Y9LJ-3NP9]; Abha Bhattarai, Walmart 
Bought Bonobos — And the Bros Aren’t Happy, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/walmart-bought-bonobos--and-the-bros-arent-
happy/2018/05/25/6e4713ac-5aa5-11e8-8836-a4a123c359ab_story.html [https://perma.cc/6J8U-Q6X3]; 
see also Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 1089, 1123 (2007); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Process: the Process/Product Distinction 
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 584-87 (2004) (describing the history 
of consumer activism in the United States). 
77. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 46-52 (2005). For example, several companies pulled their advertising from 
controversial programs like The Laura Ingraham Show and Tucker Carlson Tonight in response to 
public pressure. See Oliver Darcy, Tucker Carlson’s Show Has Been Hit by an Advertiser Boycott, and 
It’s Having a Visible Effect, CNN (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/media/tucker-
carlson-fox-news-ad-boycott/index.html [https://perma.cc/9NN8-S9LA]; Jason Schwartz, Big 
Advertisers Still Shunning Ingraham’s Fox News Show Months After Boycotts, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/16/ingraham-fox-news-advertising-902466 
[https://perma.cc/ZWZ6-MHER]. Financial institutions have also ceased financing gun manufacturers 
and the private prison industry in response to protest. See, e.g., Laura J. Keller & Polly Mosendz, BofA 
Will Stop Lending to Makers of Assault-Style Guns, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-10/bofa-will-no-longer-lend-to-some-gunmakers-
vice-chairman-says [https://perma.cc/9CNJ-XYS2]; Taylor Telford & Renae Merle, Bank of America 
Cuts Business Ties with Detention Centers, Private Prisons, WASH. POST (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/27/bank-america-cuts-business-ties-with-detention-
centers-private-prisons [https://perma.cc/6RAD-VB8Z]. 
78. Hill, supra note 2, at 1202, 1208-11. 
79. Frank Li et al., Corporate Visibility in Print Media and Corporate Social Responsibility, 
SUSTAINABILITY (2018). 
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Technology makes it easier for reports about bad behavior to spread, and today 
there even exist apps and other tools to allow consumers to investigate brands’ 
social performance at the point of sale.80 In today’s polarized political 
environment, consumers may be especially attentive to brands’ social 
performance; certainly, several companies have made that bet, explicitly tying 
their brands to controversial political stances.81 
Perhaps the biggest weakness in these kinds of shaming campaigns is that 
they are only likely to affect consumer-facing businesses; organizations that do 
not deal directly with consumers are less likely to feel the same pressure.82 That 
slack may be picked up, however, in the form of employee protest. Since the 
financial crisis, for example, investment banks have had more trouble attracting 
new graduates, apparently because the banks’ reputations for irresponsibility 
and lack of social conscience have made them less attractive prospects.83 More 
recently, Facebook’s scandals have dimmed its luster in the eyes of newly 
minted engineers and computer scientists.84 
 
80. Kysar, supra note 76, at 582-83; Rebecca Bratek, Smartphone App Reveals the Politics in 
Your Shopping Cart, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-buy-partisan-
20140825-story.html [https://perma.cc/BX8Y-ZAM4]; Megan Friedman, How a Twitter Boycott 
Contributed to the Demise of the Ivanka Trump Brand, ELLE (July 24, 2018), 
https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a22539627/grab-your-wallet-boycott-ivanka-trump-brand 
[https://perma.cc/BP9H-KVBL]. 
81. Josh Barro, Here’s Why More Brands, Like Nike with Colin Kaepernick, Are Openly 
Liberal, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/nike-colin-kaepernick-ad-
brands-more-liberal-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/4FHV-65A6]; David Gelles, CEO Activism Has Become 
the New Normal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/business/dealbook/ceo-activism-study.html 
[https://perma.cc/DK54-UFGV]. 
82. VOGEL, supra note 77, at 53. There are some exceptions; for example, corporate clients of 
elite law firms have begun to “boycott,” after a fashion, firms that are insufficiently diverse. See Noam 
Scheiber & John Eligon, Elite Law Firm’s All-White Partner Class Stirs Debate on Diversity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/us/paul-weiss-partner-diversity-law-
firm.html [https://perma.cc/WZA4-2FQ7]. 
83. Nathaniel Meyersohn, After the Crisis, Silicon Valley Overtook Wall Street as the Place to 
Be, CNN (June 7, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/07/news/economy/wall-street-silicon-valley-
google-goldman-sachs/index.html [https://perma.cc/AR4E-UBEL]; Laura Noonan et al., Beyond 
Banking: Filling the Recruitment Abyss, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f5f79cfc-8228-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767 [https://perma.cc/U7QP-LQF6]; 
Laurent Ortmans, Jobs in Banking and Finance Lose Allure, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/80f30276-7bd3-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64 [https://perma.cc/82P5-3E6M]. 
84. Nellie Bowles, ‘I Don’t Really Want to Work for Facebook.’ So Say Some Computer 
Science Students, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/technology/jobs-
facebook-computer-science-students.html [https://perma.cc/7DAK-K77L]; Lucie Greene, Big Tech May 
Be Losing Its Allure for Talented Staff, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/5e8affac-c299-11e9-ae6e-a26d1d0455f4 [https://perma.cc/9Z3S-EUKW]; 
Salvador Rodriguez, Facebook Has Struggled to Hire Talent Since the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, 
According to Recruiters Who Worked There, CNBC (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/facebook-has-struggled-to-recruit-since-cambridge-analytica-
scandal.html [https://perma.cc/8RPG-FCEV]; see also Elizabeth Dwoskin & Todd C. Frankel, The Big 
Problem for Uber Now: Attracting Talent, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-big-problem-for-uber-now-attracting-
talent/2017/06/14/6be22812-4f80-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html [https://perma.cc/BAR2-
CMG2] (documenting similar problems at Uber). 
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The movement extends beyond new hires. Existing employees at a 
number of companies have recently agitated for their employers to attend more 
carefully to the social implications of their work. At Google, Microsoft, and 
Amazon, employees have revolted against projects that raise privacy 
concerns.85 Demonstrating the power of employee protest to reach beyond 
consumer-facing industries, employees forced the consulting firm McKinsey to 
cancel a contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).86 Wayfair 
employees staged a walkout over the company’s sales to immigrant detention 
centers.87 
The fundamental point is that consumers and employees have both the 
desire, and the ability, to shape corporate behavior to comply with prevailing 
norms of social responsibility, but this cannot be accomplished without 
information. Though employees, specifically, may have special insight into 
corporate initiatives even without public disclosure, they may be bound by 
nondisclosure agreements,88 or have only a vague idea how a small assignment 
fits into a larger project.89 Public disclosure about lines of business, significant 
 
85. Kate Conger & Cade Metz, Tech Workers Now Want to Know: What Are We Building 
This For?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/technology/tech-workers-
ask-censorship-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/6W2K-UVFL]; Kelsey Gee, The New Labor 
Movement: Pushing Employers to Be Socially Active, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-labor-movement-pushing-employers-to-be-socially-active-
11561476199 [https://perma.cc/B8NR-A6BP]. Employees also persuaded Microsoft to suspend and 
review its political donation program. See Billy Nauman et al., BlackRock Under Fire, (Dual) Class 
War, PAC Attack, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4ad02fa4-b895-11e9-8a88-
aa6628ac896c [https://perma.cc/47ZR-Q75D]. 
86. Michael Forsythe & Walt Bogdanich, McKinsey Ends Work With ICE Amid Furor Over 
Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/business/mckinsey-ends-ice-contract.html 
[https://perma.cc/46CC-FQLF]. Deloitte and GitHub employees have also urged that their employers 
end relationships with ICE. Gee, supra note 85; Nitasha Tiku, Employees ask GitHub to Cancel ICE 
Contract: ‘We Cannot Offset Human Lives with Money,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/09/employees-ask-github-cancel-ice-contract-we-
cannot-offset-human-lives-with-money [https://perma.cc/DD9A-UDCX]. 
87. Abha Bhattarai, ‘A Cage Is Not a Home’: Hundreds of Wayfair Employees Walk Out to 
Protest Sales to Migrant Detention Center, WASH. POST (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/26/cage-is-not-home-hundreds-wayfair-employees-
walk-out-protest-sales-migrant-detention-center [https://perma.cc/2TNM-Z7AM]. Slack engineers 
agreed not to build tools that can be used to target immigrants. Cameron Bird et al., The Tech Revolt, 
CALIF. SUNDAY MAG. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://story.californiasunday.com/tech-revolt 
[https://perma.cc/B94U-7D2Y]. 
88. Cf. Jay Greene, Amazon Employees Launch Mass Defiance of Company Communications 
Policy in Support of Colleagues, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/26/amazon-employees-plan-mass-defiance-
company-communications-policy-support-colleagues [https://perma.cc/GP3D-6WFK] (describing 
Amazon’s policy of prohibiting employees from publicly commenting on Amazon’s social performance; 
concerns may be raised internally but discussions must be kept confidential). 
89. Cf. Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, The Great Google Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/18/magazine/google-revolt.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XPJ-3U5K] (reporting that Google has tried to prevent internal dissension by 
concealing controversial projects from all but “need to know” employees). 
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customers, and contracting partners may provide both groups with valuable 
information they can use to gain a fuller picture of corporate behavior.90 
Finally, corporate disclosure can assist citizen activism in the most basic 
of ways: political participation. Corporate expenditures on political 
advertisements and lobbying may be intended to sway voters; more information 
both about corporate political spending, and about their lines of business (i.e., 
their financial interests in matters subject to dispute) will help voters place 
these efforts in context, contributing to a more informed citizenry that is better 
able to protect its interests.91 Moreover, there are any number of governmental 
actors who may have close ties to private businesses that are difficult to 
identify; a system of corporate disclosure can reveal these relationships so that 
citizens can recognize potential conflicts and, if appropriate, agitate for 
change.92 ICE, for example, refuses to provide details of the amounts it pays to 
private contractors to detain migrants. Journalists have deduced some details by 
relying in part on the disclosures of public companies,93 but there are any 
number of privately held companies that provide detention-related services and 
operate out of the public eye.94 A system of public disclosure would make it 
easier for citizens to hold not only corporations, but their congressional 
representatives, accountable, rendering the formal regulatory system more 
effective. Indeed, the Supreme Court predicated its support for corporate free 
speech rights on the existence of such disclosure,95 with Justice Kennedy later 
 
90. Estlund, supra note 69, at 378-79 (disclosure to employees will help them select jobs on 
the basis of social performance). As in the context of regulation, see Section I.B.3, infra, the public may 
be aided by journalists or other experts in interpreting these disclosures. 
91. Sarah Haan, Voter Primacy, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2682-83 (2015). 
92. Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 573, 587-91, 
616-20 (2017) (describing industry ties of FINRA’s Board of Governors; highlighting that a lack of 
corporate disclosure may make these difficult to detect). 
93. Spencer Ackerman & Adam Rawnsley, $800 Million in Taxpayer Money Went to Private 
Prisons Where Migrants Work for Pennies, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/dollar800-million-in-taxpayer-money-went-to-private-prisons-where-
migrants-work-for-pennies [https://perma.cc/8Y96-2SVT]. 
94. Yuki Noguchi, ‘No Meaningful Oversight’: ICE Contractor Overlooked Problems At 
Detention Centers, NPR (July 17, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/17/741181529/no-meaningful-
oversight-ice-contractor-overlooked-problems-at-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/3Z3E-K3Y4] 
(reporting on flawed inspection services provided by a privately held company); Dan Primack, Pro 
Rata, AXIOS (June 27, 2019), https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-pro-rata-58ccc2ab-b4ff-406e-
8a37-9eb2d52f971d.html [https://perma.cc/J8LZ-WEJY] (describing one private prison company that 
canceled an IPO due to political controversy); PRIVATE EQUITY STAKEHOLDER PROJECT, Fact Sheet: 
Private Equity-Owned Firms Dominate Prison and Detention Services (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://pestakeholder.org/report/private-equity-owned-firms-dominate-prison-and-detention-services/ 
[https://perma.cc/YK4D-K8C7]. 
95. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet, 
prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to 
hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. . . . [C]itizens can 
see whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”). 
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admitting that the real-world disclosure system is “not working the way it 
should.”96 
3. Legal Compliance and Lawmaking 
Transparency can also make regulation more effective, both by improving 
the informational environment in which lawmakers operate and by permitting 
the public to participate in the regulatory process. Today, regulators rely on the 
generalized disclosure obligations imposed by the securities laws to engage in 
economic planning, identify potential legal violations, and deter companies 
from violating the law in the first place.97 Holistic disclosures, designed with 
regulatory needs in mind, would only improve these functions. 
Consider the example of Airbnb, a privately held company that is not 
subject to mandatory reporting under the federal securities laws. It offers more 
rooms than many of the largest hotel companies in the world, and yet regulators 
know very little about its internal operations.98 As a result, they are so hungry 
for data about Airbnb’s activities that they purchase it from a single hobbyist 
who works from home culling information from Airbnb’s website.99 
Airbnb is not an isolated case. Corporations often provide critical 
infrastructure such as rail services,100 water and sewerage,101 and medical 
care,102 through opaque private equity firms. That opacity lends itself to abuse: 
Once these services are privatized, there are often disputes over rates and 
quality of service.103 After private equity firms began providing ambulance and 
firefighting services, for example, there were complaints not only about 
overbilling, but also depleted medical supplies and slow response times.104 
 
96. Paul Blumenthal, Anthony Kennedy’s Citizens United Disclosure Salve ‘Not Working,’ 
HUFFPOST (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/citizens-united-anthony-
kennedy_n_5637c481e4b0631799134b92 [https://perma.cc/TT4V-JD99]. 
97. See Section I.A, supra. 
98. Fan, supra note 6, at 601. 
99. Olivia Carville, Meet Murray Cox, The Man Trying to Take Down Airbnb, BLOOMBERG 
(May 23, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-23/meet-murray-cox-airbnb-s-
public-enemy-no-1-in-new-york [https://perma.cc/X76E-4DQY]. 
100. Ben Protess et al., How Private Equity Found Power and Profit in State Capitols, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/business/dealbook/private-equity-
influence-fortress-investment-group.html [https://perma.cc/AW9T-J3UN]. 
101. Danielle Ivory et al., In American Towns, Private Profits From Public Works, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/business/dealbook/private-equity-
water.html [https://perma.cc/YW7B-PFAQ]. 
102. Danielle Ivory et al., When You Dial 911 and Wall Street Answers, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/business/dealbook/when-you-dial-911-and-wall-street-
answers.html [https://perma.cc/222X-XCR4]. 
103. Ivory et al., supra note 101; Ivory et al., supra note 102. 
104. Ivory et al., supra note 102. Recently, there have been accusations that a private equity 
firm intentionally drove a hospital into bankruptcy in order to profit from the land. Lydia DePillis, Rich 
Investors May Have Let a Hospital Go Bankrupt. Now, They Could Profit from the Land, CNN (July 29, 
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/29/economy/hahnemann-hospital-closing-philadelphia/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/V7VV-FTP4]. Complaints have reached the point where Congress has recently opened 
a bipartisan investigation into billing practices of private equity backed healthcare groups. See Chris 
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Many private equity firms own rental housing, or control mortgages, in large 
swaths of the country, where their aggressive tactics result in evictions, 
foreclosures, and homelessness.105 But efforts by local officials to enforce basic 
housing codes are often frustrated by an inability to even identify the 
individuals responsible for upkeep of the property.106 If these companies filed 
regular public disclosures with basic information about their operations, 
including their lines of business and history of legal disputes, governments 
might be able to develop and enforce more effective schemes of regulation. 
Localities would detect trends much faster, and be in a position to address 
potential problems before they arise. 
To be sure, regulators can and do require companies to disclose 
information to them directly, without making it available to the general public. 
But these fractured efforts could almost certainly benefit from a cooperatively 
designed disclosure package, available to everyone, for the same reason that it 
is inefficient to require investors to individually negotiate with companies for 
specific types of information.107 There are multiple federal agencies and 
countless local regulators, all with different budgets and levels of resources to 
devote to data collection. They may find it difficult—or even illegal—to 
coordinate with each other to develop a holistic view of particular companies or 
economic systems. Many are specialized, which on the one hand means they 
may not require generalized data, but on the other means they may not know 
what they do not know;108 a set of baseline disclosures may educate them 
sufficiently to make further requests for information more effective. 
Moreover, a public disclosure system improves regulation by allowing 
private actors to assist regulatory efforts. At the most basic level, public 
disclosure helps expose false reporting: If companies disclose publicly the 
information that they falsely report privately, persons with knowledge of the 
 
Flood, US Congress Examines Private Equity Role in Surging Healthcare Costs, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7c8b4d01-f1cc-3db2-8b65-589cf4c1d77f [https://perma.cc/N65X-
YMQK]. 
105. Ryan Dezember, A Hedge Fund Makes Billions Off Americans’ Underwater Mortgages, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-hedge-fund-makes-billions-off-americans-
underwater-mortgages-11545742800 [https://perma.cc/U76L-TZM7]; Todd C. Frankel & Dan Keating, 
Eviction Filings and Code Complaints: What Happened When a Private Equity Firm Became One 
City’s Biggest Homeowner, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/eviction-filings-and-code-complaints-what-
happened-when-a-private-equity-firm-became-one-citys-biggest-homeowner/2018/12/25/995678d4-
02f3-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/2FD4-UWGN]; Rachel Monroe, Gone Baby 
Gone, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 19, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144528/gone-baby-gone-wake-
housing-crisis-new-breed-real-estate-investor-destroying-america-cities [https://perma.cc/U3HL-FL2Y]; 
Joshua Schneyer & Andrea Januta, As U.S. Soldiers Battle Landlord, Confidential Records Shine Light 
on His Lucrative Business, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/usa-military-developer [https://perma.cc/4Y3B-9SUX]. 
106. Frankel & Keating, supra note 105 (quoting a City Council Member: “It’s just become a 
nightmare . . . . If I have a code violation, you can’t even find a person to get on the phone.”). 
107. See infra Part V. 
108. Cf. Shapira & Zingales, supra note 23. 
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truth may spot irregularities and blow the whistle.109 Additionally, many 
regulatory systems rely in part on private enforcement, but litigants may have 
difficulty gathering information or recognizing that a problem is systemic in 
nature. Public disclosures make it easier for attorneys to identify violations and 
tort victims, and for those victims to share information and coordinate with 
each other.110 Lawsuits by private plaintiffs may then provide a further source 
of information to regulators in aid of their own enforcement of the law, or in 
aid of further lawmaking.111 Experts, academics, and journalists can analyze 
public disclosures, and their work can then be relied upon by regulators to 
identify legal violations or areas in need of additional regulation. 
Finally, public disclosure can inspire community organization and protest. 
This may have an independent disciplining effect, as discussed above, but 
communities may also pressure otherwise reluctant lawmakers to take action 
against practices that harm the public.112 
II. Investors Versus the Public 
In the current regulatory framework, the only path to obtain holistic 
corporate disclosure runs through the federal securities laws. This regime is 
dysfunctional because the investor audience has different informational needs 
than an audience of the general public. 
A. Different Companies 
Perhaps most fundamentally, investors and the broader society need 
information about different companies. Securities disclosures are required 
when a business raises capital from the public, defined as a dispersed set of 
investors with different levels of sophistication. Under such circumstances, 
each investor might otherwise have to engage in costly and duplicative efforts 
to obtain information necessary to value the issuer’s securities, and the 
dispersion and heterogeneity of the investor pool would create collective action 
problems preventing investors from bargaining for information as a group.113 
By contrast, the noninvesting public requires information about companies that 
engage in enough economic activity to affect wide segments of society,114 
regardless of their method of financing. 
 
109. Cf. Estlund, supra note 69, at 375 (raising that possibility in the context of workplace 
hazards). 
110.  Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 31, 49 
(2014) (disclosure of corporate tax information); Estlund, supra note 69, at 373-74 (disclosure of 
workplace violations). 
111. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1657 (2016) (discovery generated in private litigation can be used to aid regulators). 
112. Blank, supra note 110, at 80 (making this argument in the context of disclosure of tax 
information); Sale, New Public, supra note 59, at 144. 
113. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 364. 
114. Id. at 342. 
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Once upon a time, the two categories may have been tolerably similar; 
because there were few options for businesses to raise capital privately, most—
though not all115—companies with a broad societal impact were likely to also 
be public for securities law purposes. However, in recent years, opportunities 
for raising capital in private markets have expanded, and thus there is a 
growing divergence between companies that are defined as public under the 
securities laws, and companies that are sufficiently large and impactful that the 
general public may have a legitimate need for disclosure about their 
operations.116 
The transformation has come in response to changes to investors 
themselves.  Whereas once most investors were retail investors—ordinary 
persons—by 1980, about 40% of all U.S. corporate equities were held by 
institutions such as mutual funds and pension funds,117 and today that figure is 
closer to 70 or 80%.118 The result is a wealthier, more sophisticated, and more 
powerful pool of investors that both Congress and the SEC have judged to be 
less in need of securities law protection. Thus, both by statute and regulation, 
the securities laws have been loosened to allow companies more opportunities 
to seek funding from wealthy investors while avoiding mandatory disclosure 
obligations.119 This has been accomplished in a variety of ways, but in general, 
the law has made it easier for companies to sell securities to certain investors 
while still treating the sales as “private” rather than “public,” allowing them to 
avoid federal disclosure requirements.120 The Exchange Act has also been 
amended to broaden the number of security holders necessary to trigger public 
company status.121 Under this new regime, companies can raise vast amounts 
of capital, and develop sprawling international operations, without public SEC 
filings.122 
 
115. Many of the largest companies in the United States are privately held and go back 
decades. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 757 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
116. Additionally, some companies that have issued securities to the public may still be too 
small to have much societal relevance. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 342. 
117. Gordon, supra note 13, at 1521-22. 
118. Amy Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of 
the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 729-30 (2018). 
119. Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public 
Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 467-49 (2017); Jones, supra note 60, at 174-77; Elizabeth Pollman, 
Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 206-08 (2012). 
120. Fontenay, supra note 119119, at 467-69; Jones, supra note 60, at 176; see also Janet D. 
Lowder, Rule 701 Additional Disclosure Threshold Raised to $10M, NAT. L. REV. (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/rule-701-additional-disclosure-threshold-raised-to-10m-sec-
solicits-comments-to [https://perma.cc/FCT4-HZ62] (describing easing of rules for issuing stock 
compensation to employees). 
121. Jones, supra note 60, at 177. 
122. Congress and the SEC have also facilitated private capital raising by making it easier for 
holders of private company securities to trade amongst themselves. See Fontenay, supra note 119, at 
470-72; Jones, supra note 60, at 174; see also Nicolas Grabar, FAST Act Amendments to the U.S. 
Securities Laws, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 16, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/16/fast-act-amendments-to-the-u-s-securities-laws 
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Uber presents a classic example. Founded in 2009, it did not offer its 
securities to the public for ten years, by which time it had swollen to a 
valuation of $82 billion.123 By the time of its public offering, it was one of the 
country’s most recognized brands, operating in sixty-three countries with over 
22,000 employees (not counting drivers).124 It also developed an unusually 
pugnacious relationship with regulators, resulting in numerous scandals around 
the globe.125 Eventually, an internal investigation revealed a work culture 
involving on-the-job drinking, drug use, and blatant sexual harassment and 
sexual discrimination.126 Yet had the company not remained private for so 
long, it is unlikely Uber’s toxic work environment could have persisted, or 
grown to the proportions it eventually reached;127 indeed, serious reform efforts 
were undertaken as part of Uber’s preparation for an IPO.128 This is because, as 
a public company, Uber would have had to disclose its sources of income and 
risks to its operations, including legal risks.129 At the same time, its Board of 
Directors would have had to sign off on any disclosures Uber made, 
necessitating that information about its internal operations be brought to its 
attention. Caught between the unpleasant choices of publicly announcing 
 
[https://perma.cc/NHH6-C6YX] (describing statutory amendments that expand opportunities for trading 
private stock). 
123. Michael J. de la Merced & Kate Conger, Uber I.P.O. Values Ride-Hailing Giant at $82.4 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/uber-ipo-stock-
price.html [https://perma.cc/9XHW-283T]. 
124. Uber, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519120759/d647752ds1a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LT4D-3663]. 
125. Jones, supra note 60, at 181; Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Fined $7.6 Million In 
California, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/14/uber-fined-7-6-million-in-
california [https://perma.cc/KUT4-MJLX]; Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-
evade-authorities.html [https://perma.cc/ZUX5-TLLU]; Mike Isaac, Uber Is Sued by Woman Who Was 
Raped by One of Its Drivers in India, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/technology/uber-india-rape-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/6F27-
QFWB]; Ben Smith, Uber Executive Suggests Digging Up Dirt On Journalists, BUZZFEED (Nov. 17, 
2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/bensmith/uber-executive-suggests-digging-up-dirt-on-
journalists [https://perma.cc/2S5X-F4TJ]; Uber CEO Kalanick Took Workers to an ‘Escort-Karaoke’ 
Bar, N.Y. POST (Mar. 27, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/03/27/uber-ceo-kalanick-took-workers-to-an-
escort-karaoke-bar [https://perma.cc/WQ9M-NRS2]. 
126. Yoree Koh, Uber’s Party Is Over: New Curbs on Alcohol, Office Flings, WALL ST. J. 
(June 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-party-is-over-new-curbs-on-alcohol-office-flings-
1497394763 [https://perma.cc/6CPY-ZYTK]; Maya Kosoff, Mass Firings at Uber as Sexual 
Harassment Scandal Grows, VANITY FAIR (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/06/uber-fires-20-employees-harassment-investigation 
[https://perma.cc/9AV4-2T2V]. 
127. Jones, supra note 60, at 166-68. 
128. Peter Blumberg & Robert Burnson, Uber Aims to Shed Troubled Past in Pre-IPO Peace-
Making Bonanza, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-
15/uber-aims-to-shed-troubled-past-in-pre-ipo-peace-making-bonanza [https://perma.cc/W5B8-CQ42]. 
129. 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 (2019); see also DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF RULES RELATING TO 
SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL 
PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY 286-87 (1980) (printed for the use of S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.) [hereinafter Staff Report]. 
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Uber’s violations of the law and systemically unstable culture, or risking 
personal liability for false statements, board members would have been 
incentivized to ensure that any deficiencies were corrected.130 
Significantly, when Uber’s legal problems spilled into the public eye, so 
did its governance structure, generating an unprecedented level of public 
attention to its board composition and the voting power of its stock131—
typically the core objects of securities disclosure.132 Yet Uber remained 
“private” because its investors (many of which were wealthy institutions) were 
deemed too sophisticated to require the securities laws’ protection. 
Uber may be an extreme case, but it is not the only one; similar problems 
have infected other large startups, including WeWork, Theranos, Zenefits, and 
SoFi.133 This is not to say that dysfunctional and lawbreaking work cultures 
cannot develop at public companies (clearly, they can134) but the secrecy 
afforded by private status, coupled with the sizes to which these companies can 
 
130. Thompson & Sale, supra note 50, at 873-74; Jones, supra note 60, at 178. 
131. REUTERS, A Challenge to Finding Uber’s New COO: Its CEO, FORTUNE (Apr. 13, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/13/ceo-kalanick-coo-search-culture [https://perma.cc/552L-C7V5]; 
Greg Bensinger et al., Uber Interviews Heavyweights for a Crucial Job: Handling Travis Kalanick, FOX 
BUS. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/uber-interviews-heavyweights-for-a-
crucial-job-handling-travis-kalanick [https://perma.cc/L5ZA-D7PG]; Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays 
With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-
kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html [https://perma.cc/5WE7-ZPV3]; Mike Isaac, 
Uber Embraces Major Reforms as Travis Kalanick, the C.E.O., Steps Away, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-holder-report.html 
[https://perma.cc/3FG6-UAFH]. 
132. Similarly, reports of related-party transactions between The Boring Company and 
SpaceX—normally the stuff of securities disclosure—have been an object of public fascination despite 
the fact that both companies are privately held. See Rob Copeland, Elon Musk’s New Boring Co. Faced 
Questions Over SpaceX Financial Ties, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-new-boring-co-faced-questions-over-spacex-financial-ties-
11545078371 [https://perma.cc/2ARN-K2TV]; WeWork, a private company, attracted attention to its 
governance structure long before it attempted an initial public offering of its stock. See Eliot Brown, 
WeWork’s CEO Makes Millions as Landlord to WeWork, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/weworks-ceo-makes-millions-as-landlord-to-wework-11547640000 
[https://perma.cc/7K93-NZKH] (related-party transactions at unicorn startup WeWork). The 
founder/CEO of a private company recently told the New York Times, “I honestly thought that people 
didn’t care that much about the inner workings of [my company] . . . . Who is C.E.O. and who is 
executive chairman—that wasn’t something that, at a private company that’s less than four years old 
that sells travel products, I just didn’t think would be news and people would care.” Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Away C.E.O. is Back, Just Weeks After Stepping Down, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/business/steph-korey-away.html [https://perma.cc/CF3Y-SB3Y]. 
133. Jones, supra note60, at 179-82; Nathaniel Popper & Katie Benner, ‘It Was a Frat 
House’: Inside the Sex Scandal That Toppled SoFi’s C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/technology/sofi-chief-executive-toxic-workplace.html 
[https://perma.cc/7B4K-43CK]; Dana Schuster, Ousted WeWork CEO Adam Neumann is a ‘Phony’ 
Who ‘Thinks He Is a Jesus Figure’: Insiders, N.Y. POST (Sept. 28, 2019), 
https://nypost.com/2019/09/28/ousted-wework-ceo-adam-neumann-is-a-phony-who-thinks-he-is-a-
jesus-figure-insiders/amp [https://perma.cc/AFN5-RCWR]; Rolfe Winkler, Zenefits Once Told 
Employees: No Sex in Stairwells, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zenefits-
once-told-employees-no-sex-in-stairwells-1456183097 [https://perma.cc/UJA7-RA4V]. 
134. See, e.g., Bethany McLean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture Allegedly 
Drove Bankers to Fraud, VANITY FAIR (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/wells-fargo-corporate-culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/2MGP-
QTXS]. 
10. LIPTON ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  10:13 AM 
Not Everything Is About Investors 
523 
 
grow, makes problems more likely to develop and less likely to be addressed, 
which magnifies the harms they can cause.135 
Nor is the issue of corporate secrecy confined to startups: It also extends 
to buyouts of public firms, usually by private equity funds. Once a private 
equity fund purchases the outstanding public securities of an existing firm, that 
firm is no longer required to file securities disclosures, and the public no longer 
has visibility into its operations.136 Recent deregulation of these private funds 
has enabled them to grow to enormous proportions—usually by raising capital 
from other institutional investors137—which only enables them to seek out 
more and bigger targets,138 taking an ever increasing number of businesses out 
of the public eye.139 Though these companies may eventually return to the 
public markets, that can take years to accomplish, if it ever occurs.140 
The sudden withdrawal of large, significant companies from public 
scrutiny has made more salient the positive externalities associated with 
securities disclosure. Commentators have lamented everything from the loss of 
 
135. Jones, supra note 60, at 178; Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 
155, 202-05 (2019) (observing that in startup companies, growth is often prized over compliance, which 
can encourage lawbreaking, facilitated by the lack of public disclosure). It has long been recognized that 
smaller public companies present a greater fraud risk than their larger counterparts, in part because the 
lesser degree of scrutiny afforded these companies makes it harder to detect misconduct. See Stephen J. 
Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small Business Capital Formation, 2 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 29 (1998); Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a 
Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 581-82 (1997). 
136. Some buyouts are financed with publicly issued bonds, in which case the target firm may 
remain subject to securities reporting requirements. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Going Private But Staying 
Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 7, 9 (2009). 
 This is not always the case, however, see Fontenay, supra note 119, at 463, and, 
especially in recent years, private equity firms have found it easier to finance buyouts with loans that 
escape federal securities regulation. See Robert Prilmeier & René M. Stulz, Securities Laws and the 
Choice Between Loans and Bonds for Highly Levered Firms (Fisher Coll. of Bus. Working Paper No. 
2019-03-01, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3314270 [https://perma.cc/D6XK-Q2KD]. 
137. See generally Chris Flood, Behold the Giants, the Vast New Buyout Funds of Private 
Equity, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/11257444-b17f-39d6-b006-
c4e774aa3c0c [https://perma.cc/E5P2-93NU]; Robin Wigglesworth, Private Versus Public Markets Is 
the Battle to Watch, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7ce1ee52-2b0e-11e9-88a4-
c32129756dd8 [https://perma.cc/3BG8-MX4U]. 
138. Fontenay, supra note 119, at 467-68. Funds’ permission to raise capital privately is 
conditioned on limiting their investor pool to sophisticated purchasers, defined by wealth. See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80a-3(c)(7), 80a-2(a)(51) (2018). 
139. Between 2015 and the first nine months of 2018, 279 public companies in the US and 
Canada were bought out by private equity firms. See Kevin Dowd, Take-Private Buyouts on Pace for 
Decade Low in 2018, PITCHBOOK (Sept. 12, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/take-private-
buyouts-on-pace-for-decade-low-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/5A6P-EJBR]. Though activity declined in 
2018, ironically, this is attributed in part to the declining number of public companies overall; there are 
fewer targets available, and those that remain are much larger than in prior years. See id. Though recent 
changes to the tax laws may slow private equity activity, see Adam Lewis, The US PE Industry in 11 
Charts, PITCHBOOK (July 30, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/the-us-pe-industry-in-11-charts 
[https://perma.cc/68X6-PRC2], the overall issue is unlikely to disappear. 
140. See Lewis, supra note 139 (reporting that private equity firms increasingly “exit” their 
investment by selling to new private equity firms rather than through a public offering). 
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public data about companies with significant impact on local economies141 to 
the loss of social control that seems to have encouraged the development of 
particularly dysfunctional—and lawbreaking—corporate cultures.142 Yet 
despite this broad recognition of the degree to which noninvestor audiences 
rely on disclosures required by the federal securities laws, few have taken the 
next step to question the wisdom of relying on the securities disclosure 
system—rather than a general system of corporate disclosure—to provide these 
benefits in the first place. 
For example, through her concept of “publicness,” Hillary Sale has 
explored the ways that securities disclosures force companies to operate with 
an awareness of how their actions affect, and are perceived by, the broader 
community.143 Sale describes this as a kind of cycle: Shareholders and 
managers can generally arrange affairs among themselves, but when managers’ 
actions have broad ramifications for society as a whole, the public demands 
more insight into their functioning, which is then provided via federal securities 
regulation.144 Sale’s thesis thus depends on corporate transparency not only to 
investor audiences, but to noninvestor audiences as well.145 Yet in today’s 
regulatory environment, transparency is required purely by dint of the fact that 
a company has chosen to make its securities available for general trading. If 
“publicness” refers to companies whose conduct impacts society, there is no 
reason why the definition of “public” for the securities laws should be 
coextensive with a conception of “publicness” that triggers a need for public 
monitoring. 
To put it another way, Sale’s “publicness” concept descends from earlier 
thinkers who argued that corporations have a public quality because of their 
ability to raise capital from many investors who exert little control over 
operations.146 This definition is generally consonant with the notion that it is 
the public sale of securities that triggers the need for greater societal scrutiny. 
However, investing today is accomplished via institutional intermediaries, 
which allows massive investment from a nominally limited shareholder base, 
even though ultimately the capital of thousands or hundreds of thousands of 
natural persons may be involved. The result is that the companies we call 
“private” for securities law purposes present the same problems of publicness 
as companies that offer their securities for unrestricted trading.147 
Commentators frequently elide the distinction between the investor-
protection rationale that justifies securities regulation, and the broader social 
 
141. Fan, supra note 6, at 599-602. 
142. Jones, supra note 60, at 179-80. 
143. Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1017-32 (2013) 
[hereinafter Public Governance]. 
144. Id. at 1013. 
145. Sale, New Public, supra note 59, at 138. 
146. See infra Section III.A; see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-7 (1932). 
147. This is a point that Adolf Berle recognized. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 8, at 148. 
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benefits that accrue from the disclosures that follow. Jennifer Fan, for example, 
has expressed alarm about the trend of allowing more companies to stay private 
and thus avoid public reporting obligations.148 Fan points out that the growth of 
large nonreporting companies has deprived the public of important sources of 
economic data, with costs borne by regulators, employees, and society as a 
whole.149 The natural conclusion, then, is that we need a disclosure framework 
that looks to audiences beyond investors. Instead, Fan argues for an expansion 
of investor-oriented securities disclosure.150 
Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson are among those who have 
directly confronted the possibility that “public” for the purposes of incurring 
broader obligations of transparency need not match the definition of “public” 
for investor-protection purposes.151 At the same time, they continue to tether 
any disclosure obligations to the federal securities laws, operating on the 
assumption that disclosure for noninvestor purposes is only needed for the very 
largest companies, and will only accompany the public sale of securities.152 
What this exercise demonstrates is that commentators have very different 
intuitions of what defines “publicness” and which companies should be subject 
to it. While some would reserve “publicness” (i.e, stakeholder-oriented 
disclosure) to America’s biggest publicly traded companies,153 Fan focuses on 
the need for basic data for local economies.154 Sale’s implicit assumption is that 
“publicness” attaches when a corporation is in a position to do significant harm 
to the broader populace.155 These competing definitions cannot be reconciled 
 
148. Fan, supra note 6, at 609; see also Jones, supra note 60, at 179. 
149. Fan, supra note 6, at 585, 591-602; see also Jones, supra note 60, at 179-82. 
150. Fan, supra note 6, at 608-11, 637. Similarly, Robert M. Ackman and Lance Cole argue 
that corporations should have obligations to constituencies other than shareholders, such as employees 
and communities, but propose as a solution that corporations be required to disclose political spending 
to their shareholders alone. See Making Corporate Law More Communitarian, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895, 
998-1002, 1008 (2016); see also Andy Green, Making Capital Markets Work for Workers, Investors, 
and the Public: ESG Disclosure and Corporate Long-Termism, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 909, 920-21 
(2019) (proposing that the securities laws require private companies to publicly disclose information 
about social performance, but adhering to an investor-centric rationale for disclosure). 
151. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 342; see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, 
Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649, 706-08 (2015) (proposing to reserve social disclosures 
for companies included in appropriate stock indices). But see id. at 682 & n.157 (questioning whether 
the SEC can manage social disclosures, and pointing out that some private issuers may leave as large a 
societal footprint as public issuers). That said, some commenters have raised the possibility of creating 
alternative disclosure regimes to ensure public accountability. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag, Patching 
a Hole in the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite the Rules That Require Firms to Make Periodic 
Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 194-95 (2013). 
152. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 342. 
153. Dombalagian, supra note 151, at 706-08; Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 375. 
154. Fan, supra note 6, at 585, 599-602. 
155. Sale, Public Governance, supra note 143, at 1013; Sale, Social License, supra note 20, at 
24. Sale’s definition has a strong pedigree; it echoes the argument of James Hurst that “The idea . . . that 
the state . . . should not intervene in affairs merely of private concern assumed that most business was 
‘private’ precisely because . . . the market existed to keep oppressive or wasteful practices from reaching 
such proportions as to make them proper subjects of ‘public’ attention.” JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 41-42 
(1970). 
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until we recognize that because disclosure has critical purposes beyond investor 
(and even market) protection, a regime in which disclosure is mandated only in 
response to securities trading is inadequate. 
To be sure, there are those who claim that the increasing ability of 
companies to avoid public disclosure is harmful to investors and capital 
markets, i.e, the core objects of the securities laws, and that the regulatory 
retrenchment is simply a miscalculation of the relative benefits and burdens of 
requiring companies to adopt public status. For example, it has been argued 
that private capital raises rely on information generated by their public 
company counterparts, and that as the pool of available information thins, 
distortions and mispricings will increasingly be felt in the private markets.156 It 
is also argued that many classes of investors—such as employees who are paid 
with private company stock—are ill-served by the new regime.157 
That set of arguments, however, speaks to whether Congress and the SEC 
have misjudged the level of disclosure that is necessary to protect investors. 
The point here is different. Even if one assumes that investors are sufficiently 
protected under the new regime, there remains the problem that securities 
disclosure, though intended to serve investors, has long been relied upon by the 
general public as a mechanism for understanding the power that corporations 
wield. And that mechanism is weakening. As the editor of the Financial Times 
recently put it in a speech on the future of financial journalism, “private 
companies and markets are, by definition, much more opaque and therefore 
difficult to report on. Holding these private companies and markets to account 
will be very hard.”158 
B. Different Topics 
The public is also interested in different types of information than investor 
audiences. Securities disclosures are keyed to the legal concept of 
“materiality,” namely facts about which there is a “substantial likelihood” that 
the “the reasonable shareholder” would consider them important when making 
voting or trading decisions.159 The SEC has taken the position that such facts 
are those relevant to “a company’s financial condition or results of 
operations.”160 Though many segments of the public may be interested in these 
 
156. Fontenay, supra note 119, at 449-51. 
157. Fan, supra note 6, at 603-04; Abraham J.B. Cable, Fool’s Gold, Equity Compensation & 
The Mature Startup, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 615 (2017). 
158. Lionel Barber, Too Big to Fail: FT Editor Lionel Barber on the Future of Financial 
Journalism, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/d2a3e50e-ef07-11e8-89c8-
d36339d835c0 [https://perma.cc/XS3B-JTF3]. 
159. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988). Materiality has been described as the “cornerstone” of the securities disclosure 
system. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1977). 
160. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
International Corporate Governance Network Annual Conference: Focusing the Lens of Disclosure to 
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matters as well, public interests are broader, and extend to the collateral effects 
of corporate activity, such as environmental impact, the treatment of labor, 
political lobbying, compliance with regulations, and the like. 
In recent years, a growing number of commentators have opined that 
when it comes to the social impact of corporate activity, the informational 
needs of investors and the public are not so far apart. So-called “sustainability” 
metrics (sometimes called “ESG” or “environmental, social, and governance” 
factors), it is claimed, are material to investors’ evaluation of long-term 
financial performance because sustainable practices ultimately contribute to, or 
predict, corporate health.161 Corporations may generate goodwill from 
customers, employees, and surrounding communities if they are perceived as 
good citizens, which may translate into higher sales, better employee retention, 
and productive relationships with regulators.162 Attention to sustainability 
matters may also signal that the company is well-run in other respects.163 In 
that way, the claim is that investor and public interests are aligned, so that 
sustainability disclosure designed for investor audiences will both satisfy 
public needs, and encourage investors to use their influence to provide the 
social control that the general public demands.164 
If all that sounds too good to be true, it probably is. The sticking point is 
that it is not likely, as an empirical matter, that sustainability practices improve 
corporate performance across the board.165 For example, though meta-analyses 
 
Set the Path Forward on Board Diversity, Non-GAAP, and Sustainability (June 27, 2016); see also 
Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-61469 (Feb. 8, 
2010) (companies should “focus on material information and eliminate immaterial information that does 
not promote understanding of registrants’ financial condition, liquidity and capital resources, changes in 
financial condition and results of operations”). 
161. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in 
Sustainability, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625 (2019); Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure 
Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923 (2019); Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs 
of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2018). The ESG Disclosure Simplification Act, introduced 
in the House of Representatives, would require that the SEC develop a system of ESG reporting for 
public companies on the basis that ESG metrics are material to investors as a matter of law. See H.R. 
4329, 116th Cong. (2019). 
162. Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the 
Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 652 (2009); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: 
The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 670 (2016); see also U.S.  
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (gauging organizational 
criminal culpability by reference to whether the behavior was internally tolerated); U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL 9-28.300 (same). 
163. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social 
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 435 (2020). 
164. E.g., Laura E. Deeks, Discourse and Duty: University Endowments, Fiduciary Law, and 
the Cultural Politics of Fossil Fuel Divestment, 47 ENVTL. L. 335, 346-49 (2017); Green, supra note 
150, at 911; Ho, supra note 161, at 439 (2018); Matthew Welch, The Year That Capital Markets Finally 
Woke Up to Climate Risk, ETHICAL CORP. (Dec. 18, 2018), http://ethicalcorp.com/year-capital-markets-
finally-woke-climate-risk [https://perma.cc/YBS2-MC8E]. 
165. Fisch, supra note 22, at 646 (“Even if the interests of corporate stakeholders are, in many 
cases, aligned, sometimes they are not. In at least a subset of corporate decisions, there is a true conflict 
between the interests of different stakeholders, and a decision that benefits one class of stakeholders will 
harm another.”). 
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suggest that some pro-social behavior may positively impact the corporation, 
the effect may be very small, especially as compared to other determinants of 
performance.166 More complex studies demonstrate that any positive effects of 
sustainability practices vary depending on the characteristics of the firm and its 
operating environment.167 Specific examples abound: Corporations can be 
recidivist “bad actors” while still seeing their stock prices rise,168 and even the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, an organization devoted to 
identifying financially material sustainability metrics, concedes that matters 
like workforce diversity are economically relevant only to a subset of 
industries.169 
This is not to claim that there is no evidence that sustainability practices 
are relevant to firm value; it is simply to point out that the evidence is varied 
 
166. Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders are Not Supreme, 5 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 87 (2015); Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay to Be Good…And Does It 
Matter? (Mar. 1, 2009) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1866371 
[https://perma.cc/5T7B-5R4Y] (finding “[a]fter thirty-five years of research . . . a mildly positive 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance” that is 
relatively insignificant when compared to other corporate practices). 
167. Edward N.W. Aw et al., A Morality Tale of ESG: Assessing Socially Responsible 
Investing, 19 J. WEALTH MGMT. 14 (2017); Bonnie Buchanan et al., Corporate social responsibility, 
firm value, and influential institutional ownership, 52 J. CORP. FIN. 73, 74-75 (2018); Heather R. Dixon-
Fowler et al., Beyond “Does it Pay to be Green?” A Meta-Analysis of Moderators of the CEP-CFP 
Relationship, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 353 (2013); Chitru S. Fernando et al., Corporate Environmental 
Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money, 52 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYSIS 2023 (2017); 
Timothy D. Hubbard, The Role of the Chief Executive Officer in Environmental Decisions, 30 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 13, 16-18 (2018); Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, The Impact of Corporate 
Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1045 (2013). 
Part of the problem is that it is difficult to study the effects of ESG on firm performance; firms tend to 
engage in more socially responsible behavior when they are already prospering. See Buchanan et al., 
supra note 167, at 74; Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh, Misery Loves Company: Rethinking 
Social Initiatives by Business, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 268, 274 (2003). Moreover, observed results vary 
greatly depending on research design. Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate 
Responsibility in an Era of Globalization and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 167, 172 (2018); 
Marc Orlitzky at al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis, 24 ORG. STUDIES 
403 (2003). Compare, e.g., Buchanan et al., supra note 167, at 74, with Karl V. Lins et al., Social 
Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility During the 
Financial Crisis, 72 J. FIN. 1785 (2017). 
168. Peter J. Henning, Do Companies Fear the Law? The Signs Say No, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/dealbook/corporate-misconduct-wells-fargo-
goldman-sachs.html [https://perma.cc/G2NC-BQYB]. 
169. See Materiality Map, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
https://materiality.sasb.org; see also Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosure in 
Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 249, 
260-61 (2019) (“the materiality of particular ESG factors to investors varies according to industry sector 
and requires a firm-specific analysis”). Similarly, Fitch Ratings has concluded that ESG scoring is 
relevant for the credit ratings of only a subset of companies. See FITCH RATINGS, Fitch Ratings 
Launches ESG Relevance Scores to Show Impact of ESG on Credit (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/10058528 [https://perma.cc/FA9C-BQWM]. Insurers, for example, 
are impacted by environmental ratings, but little else. See Luke Gallin, Majority of U.S. Non-Life 
Re/insurers’ ESG Risk Level Unlikely to Influence Rating: Fitch, REINSURANCE NEWS (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.reinsurancene.ws/majority-of-u-s-non-life-re-insurers-esg-risk-level-unlikely-to-influence-
rating-fitch [https://perma.cc/AW5A-D5GX]. Some companies claim that climate change will actually 
benefit them. Brad Plumer, Companies See Climate Change Hitting Their Bottom Lines in the Next 5 
Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/climate/companies-climate-
change-financial-impact.html [https://perma.cc/26D6-AFAH]. 
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and contingent,170 which creates problems for those who claim that disclosure 
of sustainability information will benefit investors. It is unclear that even if 
disclosed, investors can earn higher returns by trading on sustainability 
information. Any investing strategy can only be profitable if returns exceed the 
costs of implementation, and aside from the general costs associated with 
active stock-picking,171 sustainability strategies may be especially costly 
because of the need to interpret complex data.172 The fact that so many 
purported socially responsible funds use increasingly capacious definitions of 
“responsibility” in search of higher returns demonstrates the inherent difficulty 
of turning sustainability into a profitable investment strategy.173 Indeed, some 
evidence suggests that even as more information about corporations’ social 
performance becomes available, their stock prices remain unchanged.174 
Additionally, in many cases, the relevance of sustainability information 
depends on future legal action, such as the implementation of new regulations, 
or the enforcement of older ones. Yet not only are such actions difficult to 
predict, but there is no reason to believe that managers can offer shareholders 
 
170. Buchanan et al., supra note 167, at 73-74; Barnali Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 210 (2016); Esty & Karpilow, supra note 161, at 646; Roberto Garcia-Castro 
et al., Does Social Performance Really Lead to Financial Performance? Accounting for Endogeneity, 92 
J. BUS. ETHICS 107 (2010); Alberta Di Giuli & Leonard Kostovetsky, Are Red or Blue Companies More 
Likely to Go Green? Politics and Corporate Social Responsibility, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 158 (2014); 
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 163, at 436, 441-43; Jan Wouters & Leen Chanet, Corporate 
Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 262 (2008); Michal 
Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate 
Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 25-27), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439516 [https://perma.cc/4N4R-NRFK]. 
171. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 163, at 439-47. 
172. Paul Brest et al., How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value, 44 J. CORP. L. 
205, 224-28 (2018); Michael Capucci, The ESG Integration Paradox, 30 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 22 
(2018) (discussing difficulties asset managers experience attempting to integrate ESG factors into 
investment strategies); Deeks, supra note 164, at 416; Emily Chasan, How Pacific Life Lost Its Bet on 
Socially Minded Millennials, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-
07-26/assignment-pacific-life-lost-the-bet-on-socially-minded-millennials-new-story 
[https://perma.cc/A6Z9-JVMJ] (socially responsible investment platform failed in part due to high 
expenses); Paul A. Griffin et al., Environmental Performance and Analyst Information Processing 
Costs, 61 J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming April 2020) (market analysts have difficulty interpreting corporate 
environmental disclosures); Meaghan Kilroy, Performance, Transparency and Risk Cited as the Biggest 
Barriers to Sustainable Investing, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20171011/ONLINE/171019980/performance-transparency-and-risk-
cited-as-the-biggest-barriers-to-sustainable-investing-8212-survey [https://perma.cc/2KDU-EWSF] 
(institutional investors report cost and measurement difficulties as barriers to sustainable investing). 
173. Rachel Evans, How Socially Responsible Investing Lost Its Soul, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/exxon-great-marlboros-awesome-how-
esg-investing-lost-its-way [https://perma.cc/32CC-FVDB]; Jon Sindreu & Sarah Kent, Why It’s so Hard 
to Be an Ethical Investor, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-its-so-hard-to-
be-an-ethical-investor-1535799601 [https://perma.cc/95UK-Y4AQ]; Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne 
Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, CARDOZO L. REV. 
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440768 [https://perma.cc/3UN8-B67J]. 
174. Rodolphe Durand et al., Do Investors Actually Value Sustainability Indices? Replication, 
Development, and New Evidence on CSR Visibility, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1471 (2019). 
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information that is not already available from other sources.175 For example, 
though shareholders frequently request information about likely corporate 
performance under the international Paris Agreement for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions,176 countries have thus far failed to live up to their obligations 
and it is not clear they will ever do so177—leaving the associated impact on 
business highly uncertain. As one observer described it, “[p]ut simply: 
including carbon emissions as an investment issue is a bet on political 
action.”178 
Even if sustainability disclosures do not benefit investors by providing 
information sufficient to make an investment decision, they might still provide 
some benefit if they permit investors to take a greater role in governance by 
using their voice to pressure corporate managers to adopt more sustainable 
policies. But if sustainable operations do contribute to stockholder wealth, 
managers may not need to be prodded into adopting them; the market already 
provides significant incentives for managers to do whatever is necessary to 
increase stock prices.179 This is why, for example, businesses impacted by 
climate change (and that are capable of cost-effectively adjusting their business 
models) have been making preparations for many years.180 Additionally, 
although there may be some matters about which shareholders have unique 
information they can use to improve managerial decision making, these are 
unlikely to include the long-term benefits of prosocial practices.181 
 
175. Joseph P. Kalt et al., Political, Social, and Environmental Shareholder Resolutions: Do 
They Create or Destroy Shareholder Value? 3 (May 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/ESG-Paper-FINAL_reduced-size-002.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTK6-URM7]; 
Brest et al., supra note 172, at 227-28. 
176. Kalt et al., supra note 175, at 30-31. 
177. Chris Mooney, Countries Vowed to Cut Carbon Emissions. They Aren’t Even Close to 
Their Goals, U.N. Report Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/11/27/countries-vowed-cut-carbon-
emissions-they-arent-even-close-their-goals-un-report-finds [https://perma.cc/BZ5S-K6Y4]. 
178. James Mackintosh, What Could Go Wrong with Climate-Change Investing, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 13, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-could-go-wrong-with-climate-change-investing-11544716801 
[https://perma.cc/FA6J-N9UK]; see also Jon Emont, One Man’s Money-Draining Bet on Climate 
Change, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-mans-money-draining-bet-on-
climate-change-11545912000 [https://perma.cc/Y6SQ-7MJV]. 
179. See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund 
Voting Authority, 98 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 40), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404298 [https://perma.cc/MV59-W74X]. 
180. E.g., Erin Brodwin, Chocolate Is on Track to Go Extinct in 40 Years, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 
31, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/when-chocolate-extinct-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/6TBL-
HZ8C]; Bradley Hope & Nicole Friedman, Climate Change Is Forcing the Insurance Industry to 
Recalculate, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/climate-change-forcing-
insurance-industry-recalculate [https://perma.cc/HUK5-VVQP]; Lisa Palmer, Vineyards Take Action as 
Climate Change Threatens Wines and Livelihoods, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/vineyards-climate-change-threat 
[https://perma.cc/T43K-PDWC]. 
181. Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 172-
73 (2009); Griffith, supra note 179, at 40. That said, there are some theories as to why corporations may 
benefit from shareholder pressure. For example, some practices may only add value if adopted industry-
wide, and shareholders with stakes across multiple companies may provide the necessary mechanism for 
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Many investors apparently recognize as much. For example, in 2016, the 
SEC issued a Concept Release requesting public comment on whether it should 
require disclosure on topics such as “climate change, resource scarcity, 
corporate social responsibility, and good corporate citizenship.”182 Institutional 
investors expressed support for mandatory reporting, but with the qualification 
that the materiality of these matters was “sector-specific.”183 And though asset 
manager JANA Partners recently announced (with great fanfare) the launch of 
a socially activist fund that would generate profits by prodding companies to 
behave more responsibly, JANA put its plans on indefinite hold when it was 
unable to raise sufficient capital.184 The suggestion, then, is that sustainability’s 
financial relevance is limited. 
Thus, while the interests of investors and the general public may overlap 
when it comes to certain aspects of corporate social performance, they are by 
no means coextensive, and often the sustainability information sought by 
advocates goes well beyond what will enhance investors’ understanding of a 
corporation’s financial position.185 So we are left with a puzzle: Given the 
weaknesses inherent in the claim that shareholders, seeking greater wealth, will 
prod corporations into more prosocial behavior, why is there so much agitation 
around sustainability disclosure? 
The movement makes sense if we make explicit the underlying subtext: 
Sustainability disclosure is not intended to add to corporate wealth, and the 
intended audience is not, or at least not exclusively, investors. Rather, 
advocates for social disclosure view corporate power as a matter of public 
 
coordination. See Jim Hawley & Jon Lukomnik, The Long and Short of It, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 449, 
450 (2018). 
182. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064; 
34-77599 (April 16, 2016). 
183. Virginia E. Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG 
Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILLANOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 40), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452457 [https://perma.cc/AGT8-SV9W]. Surveys 
demonstrate investors’ reticence when it comes to the financial relevance of ESG strategies. See, e.g., 
Melissa Karsh & Saijel Kishan, Quant Trader Seeks $1.5 Billion for Climate Change Hedge Fund, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-14/quant-trader-seeks-1-5-billion-for-climate-
change-hedge-fund [https://perma.cc/56K8-5VGP]. 
184. Leslie P. Norton, Activist Investor That Pressured Apple Delays Launch of New Fund, 
BARRON’S (June 6, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/jana-partners-activist-investor-fund-
51559837142 [https://perma.cc/HF4B-JU6S]. Investors have also pulled back from sustainability 
commitments because of the difficulties in earning a satisfactory return. See, e.g., Kevin Allison, 
Calpers Rethinking Policy Banning Investment in Tobacco Stocks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/calpers-rethinking-policy-banning-investment-
in-tobacco-stocks.html [https://perma.cc/Y2A7-2VJD]; Heather Gillers, Calpers’ Dilemma: Save the 
World or Make Money?, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-dilemma-
save-the-world-or-make-money-11560684601 [https://perma.cc/VKF5-SFEA]. 
185. Significantly, in response to the SEC’s request for comment, many investors advocated 
for greater mandated reporting on sustainability issues precisely because corporate voluntary 
reporting—aimed at a noninvestor audience—did not highlight the specific matters of interest to 
investors alone. Ho, supra note 183, at 41-42. 
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concern, and seek transparency so that the general public will have an 
opportunity to influence its exercise.186 
Thus, information about matters that fall into the sustainability category—
labor conditions, political spending, anti-corruption measures, environmental 
impact—is primarily sought because it is of societal relevance, and only 
secondarily (if at all) because it might benefit investors.187 The goal, in short, is 
to make sustainability information relevant to financial performance, even if it 
is not currently, by empowering noninvestor groups to pressure corporations 
into improving their behavior.188 Far from pursuing investor wealth, much of 
the sustainability movement is designed to make corporate profits difficult to 
achieve unless management attends to the needs of noninvestor stakeholders. 
There are some types of investors who have an interest in that kind of 
social activism. Various individuals and groups want to align their investments 
with their ethical commitments.189 Some institutions may invest on behalf of 
beneficiaries with unified interests in specific issues that the institution seeks to 
promote, such as labor funds that advocate for worker-friendly policies.190 
 
186. Brest et al., supra note 172, at 223-24, 228-29; Choudhury, supra note 170, at 191; Tyler 
Gellasch, Joint Report: Towards a Sustainable Economy: A Review of Comments to the SEC’s 
Disclosure Effectiveness Concept Release 7-8, AM. FED’N OF LABOR-CONG. OF INDUS. ORG. ET AL. 
(Sept. 2016) (describing the informational needs of the public and corporate stakeholders, as well as 
investors, with respect to sustainability data); Green, supra note 150, at 911 (arguing that “shareholders 
and stakeholders” require more ESG disclosure); Ho & Park, supra note 169, at 273 (arguing that 
sustainability reporting “facilitates external oversight of corporations from consumers, NGOs and other 
Stakeholders”). Additionally, some asset managers appear to have jumped on the sustainability 
bandwagon as a means of justifying higher fees. Reiser & Tucker, supra note 173, at 38-39, 49, 52. 
187. See, e.g., Todd S. Asgard, Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish Environmental 
Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 35 (2014); Deeks, supra note 164, at 405-06. 
188. E.g., Green, supra note 150, at 911 (disclosure necessary so that “shareholders and 
stakeholders” can “hold management accountable”); Hill, supra note 18, at 978-79 (recommending that 
the securities laws be used to force public companies to disclose repugnant, but legal, business activity 
in order to facilitate social pressure for change). 
189. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 163, at 392-93. So-called “ESG” funds are 
becoming increasingly popular, and not always for financial reasons; according to one survey, 
millennials in particular take moral considerations into account when choosing among investments 
opportunities. EY, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: THE MILLENNIAL INVESTOR (2017). 
190. DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS SHAREHOLDER (2018); PJ 
Himelfarb & Howard Dicker, Institutional Investors and Advisors Pursue Expanded CEO Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, GOVERNANCE & SEC. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2018), https://governance.weil.com/latest-
thinking/institutional-investors-and-advisors-pursue-expanded-ceo-pay-ratio-disclosure 
[https://perma.cc/ME77-HCDK]; Emily Chasan & John Gittelsohn, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2019), 
California Pension Trustees Call for Disclosures of #MeToo Costs, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/california-pension-trustees-call-for-disclosures-
of-metoo-costs [https://perma.cc/ERM5-CE35]; NYC COMPTROLLER, Comptroller Stringer, NYC Funds 
Call on Portfolio Companies to Immediately End Exploitative Labor Practices (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-nyc-funds-call-on-portfolio-companies-to-
immediately-end-exploitative-labor-practices. Teachers’ pension funds have also used their investment 
clout to advocate for children’s safety. See Janet Lorin et al., Investors With $4.8 Trillion Push Gun 
Industry for Reform, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
14/investors-with-4-8-trillion-push-firearms-industry-for-reform [https://perma.cc/FR8G-Y74S]; JANA 
PARTNERS & CALSTRS, Open Letter to Apple, Inc. (Jan. 6, 2018),  
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/19/joint-shareholder-letter-to-apple-inc 
[https://perma.cc/XGF2-WF2J]. 
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Thus, it is hardly surprising that the AFL-CIO has explicitly urged that, in 
setting disclosure standards under the federal securities laws, the SEC adopt a 
standard for “materiality” that does not turn on financial significance, so long 
as “reasonable” investors may be concerned about the issue.191 
That said, these investors are not the norm192; many institutional investors 
are under tight legal restrictions that prevent or minimize their ability to take 
social concerns into account. ERISA—the statute that governs private 
retirement plans—has been interpreted to prohibit fiduciary administrators 
from pursuing anything other than plan wealth maximization,193 with social 
considerations to be used (at most) as a tie-breaker among alternative 
investments.194 The largest investors—mutual fund companies—compete on 
returns, and witness outflows if they cannot provide them.195 Though some 
fund providers have clearly decided that they can distinguish themselves in a 
crowded market by adopting some pretense to social responsibility,196 they are 
unlikely to make more than cosmetic overtures toward social concerns distinct 
from financial performance.197 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that even funds 
 
191. Letter from Heather Slavkin Corzo, Dir., Office of Inv., AFL-CIO, to Brent J. Fields, 
Sec’y, SEC (July 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-305.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JUY-VZH7]. 
192. See Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and How Investors Use ESG 
Information: Evidence from a Global Survey, 74 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 87 (2018) (finding that most 
institutional investors rely on sustainability information for its financial relevance); see also Tommy 
Stubbington, UK Bond Chief Stheeman Expresses Doubts on Green Gilts, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b0b31764-3932-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4  [https://perma.cc/4FRL-BCTE] 
(observing that investors are not willing to pay a premium for bonds issued to finance environmentally 
friendly projects). 
193. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1067-68 (1996); David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of 
Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106, 2125 (2014). In a recent Executive Order, President Trump 
directed the Department of Labor to generate new guidance to ERISA plans on proxy voting, apparently 
to ensure that ERISA plans do not seek to improve corporate social performance for reasons unrelated to 
wealth maximization. Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019). Moreover, even 
retirement plans that are not legally governed by ERISA have adopted ERISA’s standards. See Webber, 
supra note 193193, at 2119-21. 
194. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Field Assistance Bull. No. 2018-01 (2018). Some argue that 
fiduciary obligations even prohibit tie-breaker usage of considerations that do not contribute to plan 
wealth. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 163, at 413. 
195. Greenwood, supra note 193, at 1067. 
196. Jeff Green, The Fearless Girl Is Worth $7.4 Million in Free Publicity for State Street, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-28/fearless-girl-
earns-7-4-million-in-free-media-for-state-street [https://perma.cc/9JBA-AYTT]. 
197. Larry Fink, the head of BlackRock, penned an open letter to Wall Street CEOs calling for 
more attention to the social effects of corporate behavior as part of a strategy of long-term, stable 
growth. See Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/CUK3-9XNP]. Commenters immediately pointed 
out that BlackRock’s actual investment behavior has failed to live up to Fink’s lofty ideals. See 
Hamilton Nolan, Larry, The Fink, SPLINTERNEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), https://splinternews.com/larry-the-
fink-1822115671 [https://perma.cc/8L7X-RX6P]; Eric Posner, The Fink Doctrine (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://ericposner.com/the-fink-doctrine [https://perma.cc/6P8Y-3TGY]; see also Jan Fichtner & Eelke 
M. Heemskerk, The New Permanent Universal Owners: Index Funds, (Im)patient Capital, and the 
Claim of Long-Termism (Nov. 13, 2018) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321597 
[https://perma.cc/FFD5-QYGW] (arguing that BlackRock’s voting behavior does not align with its 
professed preference for long-term growth over short-term financial engineering). Activists and 
10. LIPTON ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  10:13 AM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:499, 2020 
534 
 
that purport to devote themselves to ESG strategies often fail to cast their votes 
in favor of ESG proposals.198 
The lesson is that even those investors who have the legal freedom, and 
the incentives, to use their power as investors to press for non-wealth 
maximizing changes in corporate behavior cannot succeed on their own; to be 
effective, they must coordinate with noninvestor constituencies—which is the 
animating force behind the demands for expanded disclosure of nonfinancial 
information.199 But when investors seek corporate information to empower 
other audiences to assist them in changing corporate behavior, they are not, in a 
precise sense, seeking investment information; they are seeking information to 
educate the polity as a whole. 
 
commentators have continued to pressure BlackRock to make a greater commitment to social 
responsibility. See Leo E. Strine, Address at the Institute for Corporate Governance & Finance: 
Fiduciary Blindspot (Nov. 29, 2018); Annie Massa, Larry Fink Confronted by Anti-Gun Protesters at 
Yahoo Summit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-
20/larry-fink-confronted-by-anti-gun-protesters-at-yahoo-summit [https://perma.cc/DV8E-238S]. 
Significantly, Fink’s letter did not emphasize corporate social responsibility for its own sake, but 
pointed out the benefits to stockholders. 
Recently, Fink announced that BlackRock would more aggressively factor the risk of climate 
change into its investment decision making, including demanding more robust disclosures from its 
portfolio companies. See Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. This move, as well, was 
explicitly tied to climate change’s relevance to financial performance, and commenters quickly pointed 
out that many of the divestment initiatives Fink proposed were quite limited and unlikely to affect some 
of the biggest climate change contributors. See, e.g., Nathaniel Taplin, The Limits of Environmental 
Activism From BlackRock’s Larry Fink, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
limits-of-environmental-activism-from-blackrocks-larry-fink-11579609219 [https://perma.cc/Q38Y-
GPUZ]. In April 2020, BlackRock admitted that, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it expected that 
sustainability reporting would be “de-prioritized.” Ross Kerber, BlackRock Says Sustainability Reports 
Might Slide During Pandemic, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-blackrock/blackrock-says-sustainability-reports-might-slide-during-pandemic-
idUSKCN2241JP?il=0 [https://perma.cc/9H7V-HSCF]. 
198. Reiser & Tucker, supra note 173, at 27; Asjylyn Loder, Funds Don’t Always Vote for 
Policies They Publicly Back, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/funds-dont-
always-vote-for-policies-they-publicly-back-11554206401 [https://perma.cc/9KAJ-J36S]; Patrick 
Temple-West, Big US Sustainable Funds Fail to Support ESG Shareholder Proposals, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5d342a5d-443d-3327-9502-2361f37f251c 
[https://perma.cc/KSP2-35UJ]. 
199. Brest et al., supra note 172, at 223-24, 228-29; James Mackintosh, Even $1 Trillion 
Can’t Make World Better Place, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/even-1-
trillion-cant-make-world-better-place-11561906980 [https://perma.cc/YW4V-NU5R]. The SEC has 
recognized this coordination function in the context of shareholder proposals. Frequently, shareholders 
rely on Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 to submit nonbinding requests that corporate directors review or 
terminate corporate policies the proponent believes to be antisocial, such as a policy of selling 
semiautomatic rifles in retail stores, see Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 
2015), or manufacturing napalm for use as a weapon, see Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 
432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Though most resolutions do not receive a majority of votes, the SEC has 
recognized that the publicity associated with them—combined with “management’s concern for its 
reputation and image with its shareholders and with the public at large”—may cause management to 
change course. Staff Report, supra note 129, at 156-57; see also John J. Flynn, Corporate Democracy: 
Nice Work If You Can Get It, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 94, 104 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green 
eds., 1973) (arguing that proposal campaigns are “a weapon for focusing public attention on the conduct 
of corporations in the social, political, and economic spheres”); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder 
Proposal Process: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 899 (1994). 
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In other words, far from establishing an alignment between the 
informational needs of investors and the informational needs of the broader 
society, the sustainability movement itself is attributable to the divergence 
between the two. The reason that religious orders,200 labor unions,201 animal 
rights groups,202 human rights groups,203 and environmental groups,204 among 
others, position themselves as investors, specifically, when seeking corporate 
information, is that only investors have a legal lever to pry open the corporate 
black box. As a result, every new demand for corporate transparency must be 
filtered through the federal securities laws. 
C. Different Scale 
The concept of “materiality” for investor audiences is tied to the 
significance of the information relative to the size of the overall business. 
Issues that might loom large for smaller businesses may have little relevance 
for larger ones, and disclosure obligations under the securities laws vary 
accordingly. Such a regime may be appropriate for the informational needs of 
investors, but is inadequate for the informational needs of the society as a 
whole. 
George Georgiev demonstrates how the materiality threshold in securities 
law can actually distort markets by handing inherent advantages to larger firms. 
Companies’ securities disclosures provide valuable information that can be 
used by competitors, employees, and suppliers to gain advantages over the 
disclosing company, but very large companies may be able to avoid detailed 
disclosures of subsidiary operations that have only a small effect on their 
overall business. As a result, these other audiences are at a disadvantage when 
bargaining with large firms relative to smaller ones, which then hinders the 
smaller firms’ ability to compete.205 The natural implication, then, is that 
 
200. Biogen, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 697560 (Feb. 23, 2017) (Capuchin 
Province of St. Joseph). 
201. XPO Logistics, Proxy Statement (Sched. 14A) (filed Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1166003/000119312517126219/d364074ddef14a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FL4J-H92G] (International Brotherhood of Teamsters on behalf of the Teamsters 
General Fund). 
202. El Pollo Loco Holdings, Proxy Statement (Sched. 14A) (filed Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1606366/000162612917000296/epl-def14a_042517.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2P23-W8FF] (Humane Society). 
203. Caterpillar, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 416309 (Mar. 25, 2013) (Jewish Voice 
for Peace). 
204. Great Plains Energy, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 574542 (Feb. 4, 2013) (Sierra 
Club). 
205. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 652-58; see also Willard F. Mueller, Corporate Secrecy vs. 
Corporate Disclosure, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 111, 112 (Ralph Nader & Mark Green eds., 
1973). 
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businesses should be required to disclose information regardless of its 
materiality to investors, in order to confer broader benefits on society.206 
The same is true of sustainability information. As Virginia Harper Ho 
observes, “companies may determine that even multibillion dollar risk 
exposure is immaterial for reporting purposes, even if a risk event could cause 
devastating losses or impose high social welfare costs on the public.”207 
The problem has only been exacerbated in recent years. Whether due to 
lax antitrust enforcement208 or for other reasons, publicly traded companies 
have grown dramatically in size, often gobbling up their smaller competitors.209 
The result is that details of their business operations are increasingly obscured 
from public view on the ground that individual contributors to their financial 
performance are not material to the firm as a whole.210 Amazon, for example, 
does not disclose revenue attributable to Prime subscribers,211 and Google’s 
parent company only recently began disclosing revenues attributable to its 
YouTube subsidiary, while continuing to omit information about the division’s 
profits and losses.212 Indeed, it is likely that because YouTube is folded into the 
 
206. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 658-62. Georgiev argues that the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 authorized the SEC to require disclosures that will generally facilitate 
“competition,” beyond what is needed for investor protection or market efficiency, apparently 
envisioning an audience of noninvestors. Id. at 661. It is hard to know if this is a correct interpretation of 
the statute, as the NMSIA’s legislative history is notoriously sparse, James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. 
Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking 
Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1818 (2012), but an alternative reading would be that it was intended 
to foster competition among certain SEC-regulated entities, see H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16, 30 
(1995); J.W. Verret, Economic Analysis in SEC Enforcement: The Next Frontier at the SEC, 82 U. CIN. 
L. Rev. 491, 496-97 (2013). Assuming Georgiev’s reading is accurate, Congress—as well as the SEC—
have broadened the mechanisms by which companies can raise capital privately and thus avoid 
securities disclosure entirely. See supra Section II.A. As a result, the SEC is necessarily hobbled in any 
attempt to foster “competition” via securities disclosure; too many companies are simply outside of its 
purview. 
207. Ho, supra note 161, at 441. A similar argument may be made about political spending; 
shareholder audiences may be far less concerned about small expenditures than voter audiences. See 
Haan, supra note 91, at 2686. 
208. Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 127 YALE L.J. 710, 717-35 (2017). 
209. James D. Cox, Thinking Holistically Before Dropping Quarterly Reporting, CLS 
BLUESKY BLOG (Aug. 27, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/08/27/thinking-holistically-
before-dropping-quarterly-reporting [https://perma.cc/YT4P-BYR5]; Sarah Ponczek & Reade Pickert, 
How Did the U.S. Stock Market Get So Old?, BLOOMBERG (March 5, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-05/how-did-the-u-s-stock-market-get-so-old 
[https://perma.cc/87QT-PYWQ]. 
210. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 630-32, 636-37 (discussing how major acquisitions, and 
lawsuits alleging serious lawbreaking or threats to public safety, may not be disclosed). Some of these 
matters may (though not always, see id. at 630-31) be publicized outside of the securities laws, but 
having the information in a clearly designated space as part of a generalized portrait of a single company 
carries its own power. 
211. The SEC has attempted to force these companies to disclose more information about their 
internal operations, but so far, has acquiesced to the argument that the details would not contribute to 
investor comprehension. Michael Rapoport, What Amazon Isn’t Telling Investors About Its Revenue, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-amazon-isnt-telling-investors-about-
its-revenue-11545480000 [https://perma.cc/NC95-LQMD]. 
212. Patience Haggin, What Investors Learned From the First Peek Inside YouTube’s 
Financials, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-investors-learned-from-the-
first-peek-inside-youtubes-financials-11580836322 [https://perma.cc/5MRN-VLQE]. 
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larger Alphabet/Google corporation, YouTube’s CEO has escaped the political 
scrutiny that other, more prominent tech CEOs have endured in recent years,213 
despite the incendiary content that the platform hosts (and has even 
encouraged).214 
III. Historical Calls for Stakeholder-Oriented Disclosure 
The American system of exclusively marrying corporate disclosure to 
public investment is unusual. In many other parts of the world, all but the 
smallest corporations are required to disclose basic information for public 
consumption.215 Yet America’s regime is no accident: As this Part 
demonstrates, it is the result of a series of historical compromises whereby 
mandatory disclosure for investor audiences was used to quell calls for more 
generalized disclosure. As we shall see, that compromise was doomed from the 
outset, because an investor-oriented disclosure system tilts corporate behavior 
more toward wealth maximization and away from social responsibility, which 
only heightens the need for corporate accountability to the public. 
A. Progressive Era Corporate Regulation 
The earliest business corporations were controlled by limitations installed 
directly into their charters. Legislators granted permission to incorporate on a 
case by case basis and defined the precise boundaries of the undertaking; 
actions outside that sphere were void or voidable via doctrines of ultra vires 
and quo warranto.216 Charters could only be amended by the unanimous 
consent of shareholders—an impossibly high bar that tightly constrained 
corporate activity.217 A variety of mechanisms kept corporations small in size, 
including prohibitions on holding companies and restrictions on corporate 
 
213. Daisuke Wakabayashi, The Most Measured Person in Tech Is Running the Most Chaotic 
Place on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/business/youtube-ceo-susan-wojcicki.html 
[https://perma.cc/DQ76-Q5AY]. 
214. Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored Warnings, Letting Toxic Videos Run 
Rampant, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-
executives-ignored-warnings-letting-toxic-videos-run-rampant [https://perma.cc/F9CU-8G6H]. In recent 
months, YouTube has clearly experienced some pressure to reform its practices, Kevin Roose & Kate 
Conger, YouTube to Remove Thousands of Videos Pushing Extreme Views, N.Y TIMES (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/youtube-remove-extremist-videos.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q74V-XH6Z], but its internal governance has still received nothing like the scrutiny of 
firms like Facebook that are forced to make their operations public. 
215. See supra Introduction; see also infra Section V.A.1. 
216. HURST, supra note 155, at 45; Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 639, 648 (2016). 
217. Pollman, supra note 216, at 648. 
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finances.218 In this manner, corporate regulation was entirely melded with the 
corporation’s organizing documents and authorization to act. 
Though these restrictions functioned partly to protect investors, they 
“responded also to the fear that incorporation would help some enterprises 
upset the market’s capacity to function as a guarantor of a healthy economic 
balance of power.”219 Barriers to growth functioned as a species of antitrust 
regulation—the overwhelming regulatory concern of the time220—protecting 
not only consumers from inflated prices, but also labor from exploitative 
wages,221 and even independent entrepreneurs (potential competitors) from 
being forced into what was viewed as a servile “employee” status.222 More 
generally, limitations on economic power were viewed as necessary to protect 
the political system from co-option by monied interests.223 
Such blunderbuss restrictions, however, could not survive the country’s 
economic development, especially as states began to compete with each other 
to draw incorporations—and thus economic activity—to their territories.224 In 
1889, New Jersey became the first state to permit corporations to own stock in 
other companies (an action that earned it the moniker of “traitor state”),225 and 
the “rapid capitulation” of other states followed.226 
With New Jersey having broken the seal of restrictions on corporate 
holding companies, giant corporations grew rapidly, transforming the 
landscape of American economic organization. These corporations were 
financed by the public sale of securities. Between 1896 and 1907, the number 
of shares traded on the NYSE more than quadrupled, growing from 57 million 
to 260 million.227 After World War I, in what was described as “the passing of 
ownership from Wall Street to Main Street,” securities ownership spread 
rapidly throughout the population.228 
 
218. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 83, 87 
(1992). For example, state law might limit corporate capitalization or the value of the assets 
corporations could hold. See HURST, supra note 155, at 45. 
219. HURST, supra note 155, at 47. 
220. HORWITZ, supra note 218, at 80. 
221. Jeremiah W. Jenks, Address to Chicago Conference on Trusts (Sept. 1899), in CHICAGO 
CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, LISTS OF THE DELEGATES, 
COMMITTEES, ETC. 27, 31-32 (Civic Fed’n of Chi. ed., 1900) [hereinafter CHICAGO CONFERENCE] 
(reserving that evidence of this effect was not dispositive); John Hayes, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra, 
at 331. 
222. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 185 (1996); Jenks, supra note 221, at 
32. 
223. Khan, supra note 208, at 740; see also Woodrow Wilson, Address Before the American 
Bar Association: Before the War: How Things Looked Then (1910) (warning that if corporations are not 
limited, they will “dominate the bodies politic themselves”). 
224. HORWITZ, supra note 218, at 84. 
225. Id. at 83. 
226. Id. at 84. 
227. Id. at 75. 
228. WILLIAM ZEBINA RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 116 (1927); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 57-3375, at 17 (1903) (“All classes invest.”). 
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The Progressives observed that the corporate form permitted great 
aggregations of capital that went far beyond what a single proprietor could 
achieve on his own, magnifying the ability of a small number of people to do a 
substantial amount of harm.229 Once corporations reached this size, they could 
no longer be considered “private” institutions; they became subject to, as 
Hillary Sale might put it, publicness, with associated public obligations.230 
William Z. Ripley, a legal scholar of the era, warned, “Little personal 
enterprises pass almost imperceptibly over into great formless aggregations in 
which what is everybody’s business threatens to become nobody’s business.”231 
The result of all of this was a new attempt to regulate corporate activity 
through limits on the corporate form itself. But because this effort had failed at 
the state level—in part due to the race to the bottom232—renewed attempts 
focused on Congress. Thus, the first third of the twentieth century saw 
countless proposals for federal chartering,233 with a focus on limiting corporate 
structure as a means of limiting corporate activity. Multiple proposals, usually 
in combination with these chartering attempts, sought to force disclosure of 
corporate activity (or “publicity,” as it was dubbed at the time) as a critical 
regulatory mechanism.234 
For example, in 1901 and again in 1903, Representative Littlefield 
introduced a bill that would require corporations operating in interstate 
commerce to file returns with the Interstate Commerce Commission containing 
basic information about the corporation’s finances and capital structure.235 
Summaries of the returns would then be published.236 These obligations were 
 
229. HURST, supra note 155, at 47; Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies, 63 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1503, 1523-24 (2006). 
230. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 146, at 7 (describing these new, giant enterprises as 
“quasi-public,” with associated obligations “towards the owners, the workers, the consumers, and the 
State”); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR 1908, H.R. DOC. NO. 60-1048, 
at 309 (1909) (stating that managers of large corporations are “affected with a public trust”); Horwitz, 
supra note 218, at 101, 104; . 
231. RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 131; see also id. (quoting the president of General Motors: 
“[T]he public interest becomes involved when the public can no longer locate some tangible personality 
within the ownership which it may hold responsible for the corporation’s conduct.”). 
232. H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, at 23 (1903) (characterizing the “financial incentive” for states to 
“furnish an asylum and breeding place for vicious, unrestrained, corporate vagrants” as “too strong for 
human nature to withstand.”); see also RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 28-37, 165; Loomis Jr. & Rubman, 
supra note 51, at 161 (discussing the contemporary derision of “charter mongering” states). 
233. Some proposed federal “licensing” rather than chartering, though there were few 
practical differences and many commentators did not distinguish between them. Melvin I. Urofsky, 
Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 166 (1982). 
234. RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 221. At this time, of course, there were no general corporate 
disclosure requirements. States would eventually begin to require that some disclosure accompany the 
sale of securities, and the New York Stock Exchange required that listed companies disclose 
information about corporate finances, but these regimes were weakly enforced and easily evaded. See 
SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 46-47. And though at one time, the Bureau of the Census disclosed 
information about corporate activity, that practice ended with the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. 
See Mueller, supra note 205, at 124. 
235. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income 
Tax, 66 IND. L. J. 53, 72-73 (1990). 
236. Id. at 73. 
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not tied to the public sale of securities, and the committee report on the bill 
made clear that publicity was intended for general consumption, including 
consumers, employees, and regulators.237 
In 1903, Congress created the Bureau of Corporations, authorizing it to 
investigate individual companies and publish their particulars.238 (Earlier 
proposals would have made publication mandatory.)239 James Garfield, the first 
Commissioner of Corporations, called for legislation that would allow for 
general disclosure of corporate information for public consumption,240 and his 
successor, Herbert Smith, did the same, urging Congress to address the 
“problem of corporate regulation” via a “broad system of corporate 
publicity.”241 Commissioner Smith went on to clarify that such publicity should 
“reach[] the average citizen under everyday conditions.”242 
In 1909, Congress passed an income tax on corporations, not so much for 
revenue collection as to force corporate disclosure of finances, which would 
then (as originally conceived) be made publicly available.243 The law did not 
distinguish between corporations with public investors and those that were 
closely held, and even those with too little income to be subject to the tax were 
still required to file returns, which would then be publicly disclosed.244 
Speaking in support of the tax, President Taft said, “If now, by a perfectly 
legitimate and effective system of taxation, we are incidentally able to possess 
the Government and the stockholders and the public of the knowledge of the 
real business transactions and the gains and profits of every corporation in the 
country, we have made a long step toward that supervisory control of 
corporations which may prevent a further abuse of power.”245 
Even after the passage of the corporate tax, a flurry of other bills called 
for public disclosure of finances, capitalization, and business operations of 
corporations engaged in interstate commerce, without regard to whether their 
 
237. H.R. 17, 57th Cong. (1903); H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375 (1903). The bill eventually passed 
the House but was never voted in the Senate. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 73 n.73. 
238. Law of Feb. 14, 1903, 32 Stat. 825. The fact that the president could choose to publish, or 
not, demonstrates that the publicity was not intended for investors specifically. See Camden Hutchison, 
Progressive Era Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017, 1059 (2018). 
239. See Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1059. Later commentators expressed dismay at the 
change. See Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing on 
S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 157 (1913) (statement of Henry B. 
Martin). 
240. RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 221. 
241. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR 1908, H.R. DOC. NO. 60-1048, at 
306 (1909). 
242. Id. at 306-07; RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 221. The proposed system would be voluntary, 
rather than compulsory, but participating corporations would be entitled to special privileges. 
243. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 113-18. 
244. Id. at 120. 
245. Id. at 100. 
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securities were offered to the public.246 Though many advocates for publicity 
were not entirely clear on whether they intended for disclosure solely to 
government regulators or to public in general,247 when they did specify they 
intended disclosure to the public, they explained that their goals were to force 
corporations to attend more to the general social effects of their activities.248 
At the time, it was believed that trust combinations were formed as a 
result of overcapitalization, namely, the sale of securities and the promise of 
dividends without sufficient assets to back them. Commenters argued that 
corporate managers would then resort to unscrupulous business methods to pay 
the dividend, including overcharging consumers and exploiting labor.249 In 
today’s parlance, we might call this a rebellion against shareholder wealth 
maximization: disclosure was viewed as a mechanism for empowering 
noninvestor constituencies to reclaim economic rents.250 Advocates for 
 
246. E.g., H.R. 17932, 62d Cong. (1912) (reintroduced in 1913 as H.R. 9763); S. 4647, 63d 
Cong. (1914); S. REP. NO. 63-1326 (1913) (describing S. 5485, 62d Cong. (1912) and associated 
amendments). Because the disclosure required by the 1909 tax law was never fully put into effect, see 
Section III.A infra, there were also new efforts to make tax returns public. Blank, supra note 110, at 43-
44. 
247. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 72; see, e.g., 1 INDUS. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT 
ON TRUSTS AND INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS 1109-110 (1900) [hereinafter INDUS. COMM’N REP.] 
(testimony of Charles N. King) (conflating annual reporting for the public with reporting for 
stockholders). 
248. Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1049 (“Among anti-corporate reformers, ‘publicity’ was 
widely viewed as a safeguard against monopolistic pricing . . . . To these commentators, shareholder 
protection was generally not a major concern, though it was sometimes cited as an additional benefit . . . 
.”). As part of his 1910 campaign for a third presidential term, former President Theodore Roosevelt 
forcefully advocated for “complete and effective publicity of corporate affairs, so that the people may 
know beyond peradventure whether the corporations obey the law and whether their management 
entitles them to the confidence of the public.” See Megan Sack, From the Archives: President Teddy 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism Speech, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 6, 2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/12/06/archives-president-teddy-roosevelts-new-
nationalism-speech [https://perma.cc/44E3-6KSY]. 
249. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 77-79; H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, at 6 (1903) (quoting 
testimony of James Dill, the attorney who designed New Jersey’s corporation law, concluding that 
overcapitalization “results either in a robbing of the capital or in a resorting to artificial means to earn 
that dividend, which artificial means commonly consist, in addition to putting up the price of material, 
in putting down the price of labor.”); 40 CONG. REC. 1849 (Jan. 31, 1906) (statement of Congressman 
Martin) (an overcapitalized company has “only two ways known” to pay dividends to investors; “One is 
to advance the prices upon the commodity which the people must pay, and the other is to reduce the cost 
of production, and often this is accomplished by a reduction of the wages of workingmen. 
Overcapitalization therefore becomes an enemy not only of the honest investor attracted to the stock, but 
it becomes also an enemy of the honest laborer engaged in the manufacture of that product, as well as an 
enemy to the consuming public called upon to pay the increased price.”). 
250. The Committee Report for the Littlefield Bill was explicit on this logic: 
it is through the medium of consumers, the purchasers of its products, that the overcapitalized 
combination finds its most extensive and oppressive contact with the public . . . . The purpose 
to create for the stock a fictitious value and thus arbitrarily increase the wealth of the persons 
interested is undoubtedly the main purpose in overcapitalization. In order to accomplish this, 
in nearly every instance the price to the consumer must either be increased or maintained 
above its natural normal level . . . . There are instances where corporations have increased 
their capitalization 100 per cent in order that what was really, say, a 12 per cent dividend 
would appear to be only a 6 percent dividends, and thus avoided the danger of making their 
employees uneasy and restive because they were not receiving in wages a fair proportion of 
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disclosure of corporate finances and business methods argued—much as has 
been argued today—that reports of excess profits would prompt consumer and 
employee rebellion, and invite competitors to enter the market.251 As one 
businessman testified before Congress in 1911: 
 
Suppose we started out and the published reports of our second year showed that 
we had made 40 or 45 per cent profit—absolutely exorbitant profit—I believe 
public opinion would get after us, and we would be fools not to reduce our profit 
to a reasonable amount. I believe it would force us out . . . Because it would 
encourage competition to enter that field immediately.252 
 
Indeed, Louis Brandeis was famous for arguing that disclosure of underwriting 
commissions would lead to the equivalent of a capital strike, and thus help 
break the “money trust.”253 Commentators also argued that discriminatory 
pricing—a practice that would eventually be prohibited outright254—could be 
combatted by forcing corporations to disclose their prices publicly.255 In 1906, 
the Bureau of Corporations did just that with respect to preferential shipping 
rates charged to Standard Oil, prompting the railroads to reform their 
practices.256 
Advocates additionally stressed that disclosure would inform regulators so 
they could craft tailored solutions to particular problems.257 At the 1899 
 
the earnings of the business . . . . Publicity, by creating an intelligent public sentiment, will go 
far toward ameliorating oppressive conditions. 
H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, at 22 (1903) (emphasis added); see also RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 168 (“Wage 
earners, whether interested as incipient capitalists or not, certainly feel as they become class-conscious 
that they have a right to know what is the relation of the return for the work of their hands to the rewards 
which accrue to the employer . . . .”). This attitude was, of course, not universal; many commenters 
argued that capitalization was simply what people would pay based on expected profit, and as long as 
facts were disclosed there was no problem. See, e.g., W. Bourke Cochran, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, 
supra note 221, at 470. 
251. See, e.g., Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: 
Hearing on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 995-1024 (1913) 
(statement of Lawrence Laughlin); H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, at 4 (1903) (quoting the Industrial 
Commission report from 1900, recommending that the largest corporations publish detailed financial 
statements “to encourage competition when profits become excessive, thus protecting consumers against 
too high prices and to guard the interests of employees by a knowledge of the financial condition of the 
business which they are employed.”); Jenks, supra note 221, at 30-34 (noting concerns about 
overcapitalization, and suggestions that disclosure would protect investors and consumers, and invite 
competition); RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 167 (“revelation of profits by concerns which threaten to 
oppress the public would operate almost automatically … to invite corrective competition”). 
252. See Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: 
Hearing on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 1040-41 (1913) (statement 
of C.U. Carpenter). 
253. BRANDEIS, supra note 1, at 102-04. 
254. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
255. An Act to Regulate Commerce, Etc.: Hearings on House Bill 19745, 60th Cong. 77 
(testimony of Theodore Marburg); REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS FOR 1908, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 60-1048, at 307 (1909); W. Bourke Cochran, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 468. 
256. H.R. DOC. NO. 60-1048, at 307. 
257. Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing 
on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 1040-19 (1913) (statement of Sen. 
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Chicago Conference on Trusts,258 one speaker explained, “Shall [trusts] be 
brought under the light of publicity and examination so that the good and bad 
in their tendencies can be better determined . . . ? It is the right of society to 
know if this new-born creature of conditions is humanity’s offspring or is a 
coiled serpent.”259 Corporations Commissioner Garfield argued that disclosure 
would permit government regulators to pin responsibility for corporate 
misconduct on specific individuals, and thereby deter such wrongs in the first 
place, while also allowing the “people of our country [to] form an intelligent 
opinion of industrial conditions, and not be driven to extreme and unwise 
action by the clamor of those who assail all great corporate interests because 
some have done ill.”260 The notion that disclosure would educate the public and 
permit a national conversation about the wisdom of great corporations was a 
common theme in commentary.261 
More generally, there was an inchoate sense that disclosure would simply 
deter all forms of business misconduct.262 As Marjorie Kornhauser points out, 
this was the era of muckraking; it was believed that exposure would eventually 
lead to change.263 Testifying before the Senate in 1911, Elbert Gary, the chair 
of US Steel, opined that “We were early taught that the one who loves darkness 
 
Newlands) (describing a bill for corporate publicity he had introduced: “Its primary result will be to 
furnish both to Congress and to the public the accurate and broad information on corporate conditions 
that is necessary to determine the line of further advance.”); H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, at 22-23 (1903) (“It 
is not claimed that publicity is a cure-all. . . . Full publicity should add materially to our information on 
this abstruse subject, and enable us . . . to act more intelligently and efficiently in enacting legislation . . 
. .”); Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 80. 
258. The conference was convened by the Civic Federation of Chicago to discuss the trust 
issue, and was attended by a “wide range of figures from government, academics, journalism, labor, the 
legal profession, and elsewhere.” Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1034. 
259. William Fortune, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 56-57; see also H.R. DOC. 
NO. 60-1048, at 309 (“Such supervision and the making and reviewing of regular reports will necessitate 
constant contact and conference between [the government and industry]. This is perhaps its greatest 
advantage. So complex a subject-matter as our immense industrial machinery can not be intelligently 
adjusted without constant conference by all parties concerned.”); William Dudley Foulke, CHICAGO 
CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 582 (“Periodical statements and examinations should be made not only 
of stock, salaries, property, dividends, wages, prices of materials bought and goods sold, but of all other 
matters which tend to throw light upon the condition of the corporation and its management of the 
particular industry involved. This publicity will restrain many abuses, and it will throw light upon the 
question as to what further legislation is needed.”). 
260. RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 221-22. 
261. Corporations Commissioner Smith expressed the same view in a subsequent report: 
“Such a system [of disclosure] will give the information necessary to make public opinion intelligent . . . 
. Public opinion, now disturbed by a knowledge of the unfair and illegal methods of a comparatively few 
corporate managers, will thus have the facts as to all large concerns and be able to discriminate between 
the few evil doers and the great mass of fair and law-abiding companies.” H.R. DOC. NO. 60-1048, at 
308-09. Similarly, a speaker at the Chicago Conference opined that with publicity, “The people 
meanwhile will be rapidly educated…. Economic discussion is at last so far popularized that the people 
will take a passionate interest in the coming debate…. No industrial event ever gave a more magnificent 
occasion for education upon what is deepest in the so-called social question.” John Graham Brooks, 
CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 61. 
262. Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1038 (observing that progressive reformers “were rarely 
clearer in justifying publicity’s importance, though they presented it as a panacea for a host of economic 
issues”). 
263. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 75. 
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is the one whose deeds are evil, and that is particularly true of business life. 
There is nothing like publicity—allowing the public to look into a company to 
see what it is doing, to know what its figures are.”264 Or, as one academic 
colorfully put it, “I think any man who has been abroad as much as I have and 
seen the difference between the way a young man behaves at home and the way 
he behaves in Turkey will agree that a little publicity—the watchful eye of a 
friend there—is a very powerful influence in making him decent.”265 
In truth, at least some of the enthusiasm for disclosure as a mechanism of 
regulation was surely rooted in the expectation that it would stave off more 
onerous government intervention.266 One JP Morgan partner gave the game 
away when he told Congress that “I believe so thoroughly that publicity of the 
right sort would be a very strong deterrent on the management of any company 
from doing anything that was not right, and would be so convincing to the 
public that what was done was being done right, that we would find ourselves 
relieved from the necessity of resorting to a long schedule of fixed rules, which 
were to the effect, ‘Thou shalt not,’ ‘thou shalt not,’ and ‘thou shalt not.’”267 
Still, commentators from all ends of the spectrum argued that “what was then 
commonly referred to as ‘pitiless publicity’ was desirable as to corporate 
matters,”268 for the benefit of the consuming and laboring public. 
At the same time—and in somewhat contradictory fashion—it was also 
agreed that overcapitalization was bad for investors, because (in an echo of 
those who critique the allegedly short-termist outlook of managers today)269 
even though they would reap outsized dividends for a time, the profits thereby 
generated were unsustainable, which would eventually result in a market 
crash.270 This, too, would be cured by disclosure, as investors would be 
unwilling to buy securities in a venture that did not have sufficient assets to 
justify the prices.271 
 
264. Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing 
on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 696 (1913) (statement of Elbert 
Gary); see also H.R. DOC. NO. 60-1048, at 307 (“Again and again the mere exposure of improper 
business methods has led to their abandonment without any further action.”). 
265. Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing 
on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 747-48 (1913) (statement of John 
Gray). 
266. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 81. 
267. Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce: Hearing 
on S. 2941 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 1125-26 (1913) (statement of 
George W. Perkins); see also id. at 534 (statement of Seth Low). Corporatists may also have supported 
publicity to avoid a “market for lemons” problem and differentiate themselves from more speculative or 
fraudulent ventures. Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1050. 
268. LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, S. DOC. NO. 70-92 pt. 
69-A., at exh. 6083 (1934). 
269. James Park, Do the Securities Laws Promote Short-Termism?, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
991 (2020). 
270. H.R. REP. NO. 57-3375, pt.1, at 3-4, 19; Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 77; Edward 
Rosewater, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 459-60. 
271. Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1049; e.g., INDUS. COMM’N REP., supra note 247, at 15 
(statement of F.B. Thurber) (“You are going to see, within a year or two, a crash in these industrials, in 
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Eventually, it was this sort of divide and conquer that did the Progressive 
movement for publicity in. Canny commentators distinguished between 
disclosure intended for regulators (which could then be concealed from the 
public), and disclosure intended for investors, which would only be necessary 
for companies that sought public investment.272 Disclosure for other audiences 
generally fell by the wayside. John R. Dos Passos, an attorney who was 
instrumental in building the Sugar Trust, testified in 1899 that he understood 
that investors and the government may have need of some information, but: 
 
[I]f you were to make a law by which the whole public could pass through the 
office of a corporation and look at its affairs as you would pass through a street 
and look through the windows into an office to discover what was going on 
there—I say that such a license to the general public would be infringing the 
rights of the corporation—it would be infringing individual rights; you would be 
guilty of transcending the power of government.273 
 
Through arguments along these lines, opponents gutted the disclosure 
aspects of the 1909 Corporate Tax, first by Treasury regulation, and then by a 
statutory amendment that gave the president authority to determine when to 
make returns public. The subsequent rulemaking provided that only the returns 
of companies that sought public investment would be published; for closely 
held corporations, stockholders alone would have a right of inspection if they 
could show a proper purpose, not unlike the inspection rights that usually 
existed under state law.274 
These rules thus became the antecedents of the Securities Acts, passed in 
1933 and 1934, which explicitly required disclosure only geared to investors, 
 
which the resources of thousands and thousands of people who have put their money into these 
securities will be wiped out; and the only remedy that I can see is such control as will require 
publicity.”). 
272. See, e.g., Azel F. Hatch, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 71 (recommending 
publicity for investor protection, when the public is invited to purchase securities); F.B. Thurber, 
CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 131 (only investors require the protection of publicity); 
Aaron Jones, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 220 (recommending disclosure to government 
for purposes of regulation); John M. Stahl, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note 221, at 224 (same); 
Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 81 (discussing how the National Association of Manufacturers argued 
disclosure was necessary only for companies that offered securities publicly); Abram F. Myers, Federal 
Regulation of Corporations Under the Commerce Clause, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 143, 147 
(1927) (recommending disclosure to the government and to investors and noting that the informational 
needs of the general public may be satisfied by anonymized government publications “for the purpose of 
guiding business development and promoting business stability”). As a result, in addition to bills calling 
for generalized publicity, numerous other bills were put forth during this period specifying that 
disclosure was intended only for government regulators or investors. See, e.g., S. 6238, 58th Cong. 
(1905) (disclosure to government); H.R. 10704, 59th Cong. (1906) (same); H.R. 66, 58th Cong. (1903) 
(reports to stockholders); S. 1612, 67th Cong. (1921) (disclosure for corporations that sell securities 
publicly); H.R. 188, 66th Cong. (1919) (same). 
273. INDUS. COMM’N REP., supra note 247, at 1164 (statement of John R. Dos Passos). 
274. Kornhauser, supra note 235, at 125-31. 
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and only when securities were offered to the general public.275 At first, the 
securities disclosure regime nodded toward public informational needs by 
housing regulatory authority in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); even that 
concession, however, was eliminated with the creation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 1934.276 Meanwhile, Congress provided that the FTC 
and other agencies collect corporate data for government use.277 Though this 
data was sometimes compiled into public reports, the reports spotlighted 
industry trends without providing ongoing transparency regarding individual 
companies.278 
That said, the Securities Acts and the disclosure they required resulted in 
many of the positive externalities that earlier proponents of publicity hoped to 
achieve directly.279 Eventually, much of the substantive regulation sought by 
federal chartering was shunted into external regulatory systems,280 with each 
area of concern addressed separately via different federal agencies, and little 
attention paid to the notion of disclosure to the public as a generalized 
regulatory tool. By 1938, World War II had derailed the project of federal 
chartering altogether, putting the issue on the backburner for the next several 
decades. 
The great irony, then, is that commenters of the Progressive Era sought to 
make corporations more responsive to the needs of the general public, but by 
acquiescing to a disclosure system predicated only on the needs of investors, 
they granted investors—over employees, consumers, and the surrounding 
community—a privileged position in the corporate hierarchy. Though other 
agencies did (and in the future, would) attend to these other interests,281 only 
 
275. Id. at 131. At the time, Ferdinand Pecora defended the limited nature of the Securities 
Act of 1933 on the ground that “If there is a rainstorm, and an umbrella is not handy, a newspaper might 
sometimes give shelter temporarily.” Loomis Jr. & Rubman, supra note 51, at 165-66. 
276. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 70-72, 97-99. 
277. Stanley E. Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade Commission: 50 Years 
Experience, 24 FED. B.J. 489 (1964). 
278. On several occasions the FTC’s investigative powers became a political football, with 
Congress withholding funds and industry lobbying to defeat various reporting requirements. Id. at 493-
94, 500-01; David J. Ravenscraft & Curtis L. Wagner III, The Role of the FTC’s Line of Business Data 
in Testing and Expanding the Theory of the Firm, J.L. & ECON. 703, 706-07 (1991); see also RALPH 
NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 135 (1976). 
279. For example, the Exchange Act forced disclosure of cost of sales, enabling both 
competitors and customers to examine—and exploit—large profit margins. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1353-54 n.33 (1999). 
280. Hutchison, supra note 238, at 1096. For example, though federal chartering proposals 
often prohibited interlocking directorates among competing companies, these were eventually prohibited 
in the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2018). Issues pertaining to employee wages and unionizing were 
addressed with minimum wage and labor laws. See Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of 
Business?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2004). 
281. Those other agencies include the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Food 
and Drug Administration for consumers, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration for workers, the Environmental Protection Agency for 
communities, and so forth. 
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investors received generalized disclosure, with all of its potential as a 
mechanism for pressuring corporations outside of the regulatory system. 
B. 1970s Revitalization of the Corporate Governance Movement 
Corporate theory and associated proposals for corporate governance 
reform subsided post-World War II.282 Meanwhile, the disclosure required by 
the securities laws necessarily served other constituencies as well, and over 
time, the laws were expanded to encompass more companies,283 permitting 
disclosure to investors to do the work of disclosure for the benefit of society as 
a whole. 
The 1960s and 1970s then witnessed a series of scandals—including 
Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and the sudden collapse of the respected Penn 
Central railroad—that simultaneously shook faith in the ability of corporate 
management to run private firms responsibly, and the ability of government to 
regulate them.284 Appealing to the same idea of corporate “publicness” that had 
motivated the Progressives, activists began agitating anew for corporate 
governance reforms that would constrain industry power.285 Disclosure, 
specifically, was advocated as a mechanism of creating accountability,286 
which exhibited itself in a number of ways. In 1974, Congress passed the 
Freedom of Information Act,287 allowing the public to petition for access to 
federal agency records and information. In 1975, the Federal Trade 
Commission adopted a new “line of business” reporting initiative that sought 
detailed information from large conglomerates on individual business units, 
with the intention of publishing aggregated, anonymized analysis of industry 
trends.288 The 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act required lending 
institutions to report data on mortgages issued and purchased, explicitly to 
allow local communities to identify instances of racial “redlining.”289 
A movement for corporate disclosure designed for the broader public 
played out at the SEC. In 1971, a group of public-interest organizations 
petitioned the SEC to require that public companies disclose information about 
their impact on the environment, and statistics on the racial and gender makeup 
 
282. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 372 
(2016). 
283. Guttentag, supra note 151, at 166-68. 
284. Pargendler, supra note 282, at 373-74; Gordon, supra note 13, at 1515; Robert L. Rabin, 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1281 (1986). 
285. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., supra note 278, at 17; Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-
Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 422 (1971). 
286. Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 50-51 
(1976). 
287. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
288. Ravenscraft & Wagner III, supra note 278, at 706-07 (describing how the initiative was 
abandoned in the face of industry opposition). 
289. Charles M. Lamb et al., HMDA, Housing Segregation, and Racial Disparities in 
Mortgage Lending, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 249, 254-60 (2016). 
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of their workforce.290 Though the organizations argued that such information 
was material to investors (both because it was relevant to financial 
performance, and because it would guide “ethical” investment), they also 
emphasized the information’s relevance to other stakeholders, pointing out that 
disclosure would “further public education”291 and “stimulat[e] greater concern 
in civil rights and related areas.”292 The SEC issued a notice of rulemaking but 
ultimately made few changes, prompting the petitioners to sue in federal 
court.293 When they did so, they claimed standing not merely as shareholders, 
but also as citizens who enjoyed the environment, and as “public educators” 
whose “broad public education purposes require information.”294 
The district court agreed that the SEC had not sufficiently considered the 
petitioners’ request. Because “the rules adopted by the agency will have a 
broad impact not merely on those regulated companies, but also on the general 
public in a matter which vitally concerns the public and transcends economic 
issues,” the court reasoned, the SEC should have issued a notice of rulemaking 
that detailed the breadth of the issues under consideration, so as to solicit 
comment from a wide range of society.295 
After nineteen days’ worth of hearings,296 in 1975 the SEC issued a 
release reaffirming its belief that “insofar as investing is concerned, the primary 
interest of investors is economic.” The Commission concluded that “the Acts 
and the relevant legislative history also suggest that a prime expectation of the 
Congress was that the Commission’s disclosure authority would be used to 
require the dissemination of information which is or may be economically 
significant,” and that the Commission “is generally not authorized to consider 
the promotion of social goals unrelated to the objectives of the federal 
securities laws . . . .”297 When the petitioners renewed their court challenge, the 
D.C. Circuit deferred to the SEC’s authority, characterizing its “primary 
mandate” as the “financial protection of investors.”298 
Despite this victory, the skirmish apparently left the SEC chastened. It 
subsequently reinterpreted its rules to require that public companies make 
expansive disclosures about environmental compliance, regardless of whether 
the dollar amounts involved were significant in light of the company’s overall 
 
290. Stevenson, supra note 286, at 53-57. 
291. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC I), 389 F. Supp. 689, 692  (D.D.C. 1974). 
292. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC III), 606 F.2d 1031, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
293. Stevenson, supra note 286, at 54. 
294. NRDC I, 389 F. Supp. at 698. The district court accepted this account of the plaintiffs’ 
standing. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit did not pass on this aspect of the district court’s standing 
determination. 
295. Id. at 700. 
296. Stevenson, supra note 286, at 56. 
297. Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14, 1975). The SEC reserved that in the context of 
shareholder proposals specifically, “the primacy of economic matters . . . is somewhat less.” 
298. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC III), 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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finances.299 Ultimately, however, the SEC concluded these new standards 
resulted in “less readable disclosure documents” that made it “more difficult to 
identify significant environmental proceedings,”300 and returned to an 
economic materiality standard.301 
The SEC took a similarly meandering path with what came to be known 
as the “management fraud” cases. In the wake of Watergate, the SEC 
discovered that many corporations had established “slush funds” that they used 
for a variety of unsavory purposes, including corporate and political bribery 
around the globe (though always, at least in the view of corporate managers, in 
pursuit of corporate profits to benefit investors). These activities not only 
violated various anti-bribery statutes, but they also necessitated lying to 
investors, if only to cover up the true nature of corporate expenses. In some 
cases, however, the amounts involved were quite small, giving rise to a 
question whether they were “material.” The SEC began to develop a theory of 
“qualitative” materiality, suggesting these actions bore on management 
integrity regardless of whether the dollar figures—either the bribes themselves, 
or the business to which they related—were material in the economic sense, 
and therefore would need to be disclosed.302 As one Commissioner 
characterized the move, “We are expanding our concept of materiality to 
include information which reflects upon the accountability of officers and 
directors, to shareholders and to a wider constituency.”303 
That kicked off years of controversy, with detractors arguing that the SEC 
was using securities disclosure to shape corporate behavior in a manner that 
went beyond investor and market protection,304 and champions defending the 
practice for the same reason.305 Commissioners both current and former 
expressed their dismay,306 and ultimately the effort was abandoned by the early 
1980s.307 
 
299. Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform – The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directions at 
Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 792 (2016). 
300. Proposed Amendments to Item 5 of Regulation S-K Regarding Disclosure of Certain 
Environmental Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 6315, 46 Fed. Reg. 25638, 25640 (May 4, 
1981). 
301. Karmel, supra note 299, at 792. 
302. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BANKING-HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS 
COMMITTEE IN MAY 1976, at 15. 
303. Roberta S. Karmel, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Changing Concepts of Materiality 4 
(Apr. 12, 1978), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1978/041278karmel.pdf [https://perma.cc/72XZ-
QV5Q] (emphasis added). 
304. Milton Freeman, The Legality of the SEC’s Management Fraud Program, 31 BUS. L. 
1295 (1976). 
305. Stevenson, supra note 286, at 85-87. 
306. Bevis Longstreth, SEC Disclosure Policy Regarding Management Integrity, 38 BUS. 
LAW. 1413, 1423-27 (1983); AA Sommer Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. J. 263, 270-75 
(1976). 
307. James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth 
Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 WIS. 
L. REV. 315. In reaction to the scandals, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 
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Yet even as the SEC reaffirmed its focus on investors and its commitment 
to materiality as a financial concept, it also recognized that a corporation’s 
social behavior can have economic relevance to the extent its activities are 
legally or morally risky enough to jeopardize either its finances or its 
goodwill.308 This stance became especially important because, beginning in the 
1960s and continuing into the early 1970s, Congress passed a bevy of new laws 
designed to protect consumers, workers, and the environment from industrial 
harm.309 Each new statute gave rise to new corporate obligations and liabilities, 
thus triggering new disclosure obligations about corporations’ social 
performance, if only to alert investors to their financial implications.310 The 
cumulative effect was to enhance disclosures of matters of general public 
interest even as they were filtered through an investor-centric lens.311 
Efforts to expand corporate disclosures to serve stakeholder audiences did 
not stop with the SEC; rather, this period also saw a renewed interest in federal 
chartering.312 Though advocates vacillated between prioritizing the protection 
of investors and protection of noninvestor constituencies, those who sought 
reform on behalf of noninvestors often recommended disclosure for those 
audiences.313 
The most prominent proposal along these lines appeared in the 1976 book 
Taming the Giant Corporation, by Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel 
Seligman.314 As relevant here, the authors railed against “corporate secrecy,”315 
 
1977. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2018)). Among other things, the Act required corporations to keep 
accurate internal books and records and prohibited them from bribing foreign officials. Though the 
FCPA is primarily enforced by the SEC, it does not impose new disclosure obligations. 
308. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC III), 606 F.2d 1031, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 
1979); see also Karmel, supra note 303, at 4-5; Staff Report, supra note 129, at 277, 286-87; Sommer 
Jr., supra note 306, at 269-70 (recognizing that illegal payments may be material due to their riskiness, 
if not their absolute size). 
309. Rabin, supra note 284, at 1284 (describing a “legislative eruption [that] affected virtually 
every sector of the economy”). 
310. Staff Report, supra note 129, at 247-48, 286-87. 
311. This was especially true because during this period, the SEC expanded its disclosure 
requirements to capture soft information about corporate segments, trends, and plans. See Gordon, supra 
note 13, at 1553-56. As a result, corporate securities filings dramatically increased in length and 
informativeness. 
312. Pargendler, supra note 282, at 377; see also William L. Cary, A Proposed Federal 
Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 BUS. L. 1101 (1974); William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Joel F. Henning, Federal 
Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915 
(1972); Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS. L. 
991 (1976); Donald E. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEO 
L.J. 57 (1971). 
313. See, e.g., Douglas Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other 
Arguments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1976); Flynn, 
supra note 199, at 94, 103-05; Mueller, supra note 205, at 111; Theodore Sonde & Harvey Pitt, 
Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to ‘Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!,’ 16 HOW. L.J. 
831 (1971). 
314. NADER ET AL., supra note 278, at 133-79. 
315. Id. at 133-36. 
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and proposed that federally chartered corporations—which would include the 
largest companies, as measured by sales and number of employees316—issue a 
single annual report “equally available to shareholders, the SEC, and other 
interested persons,”317 with a second corporate register to include additional 
details. The reports would include a variety of social disclosures, such as data 
about environmental impact, worker safety, political expenditures, and 
employment discrimination, as well as more granular financial information that 
was not required under the securities laws.318 These disclosures would inform 
not only ethical investors, but would also educate communities about the 
“hidden tolls local companies impose—such as pollution, discrimination or 
underpayment of taxes.”319 Disclosure would “help to loosen the tight embrace 
between government and business,” and help understaffed government offices 
identify legal violations.320 As they argued, “[t]his dissemination process will 
ensure that citizens, investors, consumers, competitors, and employees will 
have access to the kind of data they need to make intelligent political and 
economic decisions.”321 
These proposals eventually worked their way into the Corporate 
Democracy Act, introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman 
Rosenthal in 1980.322 The Act, which covered businesses based on size rather 
than securities trading,323 sought to remedy the “limited nature . . . of 
information . . . currently required to be reported to shareholders, employees, 
government agencies, local communities and the general public” by requiring 
disclosures similar to those recommended by Nader, Green, and Seligman.324 
Yet the SEC, which was to administer the disclosure provisions of the Act, 
objected on the grounds that the Commission had no special expertise or 
insight with respect to disclosures intended for noninvestor audiences regarding 
topics of limited financial relevance.325 
Significantly, the Senate counterpart to the Corporate Democracy Act was 
Senator Metzenbaum’s Shareholders’ Rights Act,326 the only one of the two to 
 
316. Id. at 240. 
317. Id. at 139. 
318. Id. at 140-65. 
319. Id. at 136. 
320. Id. at 136-37. 
321. Id. at 140. 
322. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980). In introducing the Act, Congressman Rosenthal also 
described corporations as “private governments.” 126 CONG. REC. 7634 (1980). 
323. Similar to Nader’s proposal, “large” was defined by reference to assets or sales, plus 
number of employees. Corporations with fewer than twenty-five stockholders were excepted from the 
Act’s coverage. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980). 
324. Id., tit. II. These reports were to be made available to “any member of the public upon 
request.” 
325. Staff Report, supra note 129, at 321-23. The Staff also contended that the proposal 
process presented a better opportunity for shareholders to seek noneconomic information, if only 
because then shareholders could work out the types of social information they needed, rather than have 
the SEC attempt to develop a standard. Id. at 277. 
326. S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980). 
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receive hearings. As the title of the latter indicated, rather than make 
corporations more responsive to society as a whole, the Shareholders’ Rights 
Act was designed specifically to enhance shareholder welfare. Instead of 
redefining the concept of a public company, the Act applied only to larger 
corporations that already were subject to securities reporting requirements.327 
Though the Act itself was never passed in full, many of its specific provisions 
later became part of the federal securities laws.328 
In sum, just as happened during the Progressive Era, a movement that 
began by seeking corporate transparency to the wider society was redirected 
toward disclosure to investors or, through new regulatory statutes, to 
government agencies.329 Yet that was enough to (at least temporarily) chill calls 
for further reform. 
C. The Modern Era 
Despite this history (or perhaps because of it), today’s movement for 
greater corporate disclosure remains focused on information that can be 
plausibly portrayed as having economic significance to investors, with 
forthright calls for mandatory reporting for stakeholders having largely fallen 
out of favor. Commentators occasionally recommend public reporting along 
particular dimensions—such as environmental performance,330 workplace 
diversity and pay practices,331 mortgage lending,332 and corporate tax 
payments333—in order to educate the public and shame bad actors, yet these 
requests for disclosure of isolated items only underscore the need for a 
comprehensive, rather than fragmented, system, both to give audiences a 
complete picture of corporate performance, and to ensure that burdens on 
businesses are considered holistically rather than piecemeal. 
Though various organizations have developed reporting frameworks for 
social performance, these are usually pitched as voluntary, rather than 
mandatory, measures, especially in the United States. Even proposals to give 
employees and other constituencies more power within the corporate form—
 
327. The Act only applied to companies with assets or revenues above a certain threshold, and 
that also had 500 or more shareholders. At the time, 500 was also the threshold for triggering SEC 
disclosure obligations; that number has since been enlarged. See Jones, supra note 60, at 177. 
328. Among other things, the Act imposed set standards for director independence, and 
required the creation of audit and nominating committees. These ultimately became federal law, in 
modified form, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. 
329. For example, the EEOC requires companies to report data about workforce diversity; 
environmental statutes require reporting of emissions data and other hazards. See supra Section I.A. The 
result is that companies report streams of compliance data to regulators on an ongoing basis. See Rory 
Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019). 
330. Case, supra note 70, at 438. 
331. Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 1006; Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace 
Transparency to Information About Pay, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781, 783 (2014); Gowri Ramachandran, 
Pay Transparency, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2012); Williams, supra note 28, at 1731. 
332. Lamb et al., supra note 289289, at 261. 
333. Blank, supra note 110, at 109-20. 
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such as by permitting them to vote for directors—tend to neglect the 
importance of disclosure tailored to noninvestor interests.334 For example, 
Elizabeth Warren recently introduced the “Accountable Capitalism Act,” which 
would give employees of the nation’s largest corporations the right to elect 
directors to the boards of their employers. But the Act does not propose any 
disclosures geared to employee concerns; indeed, because the covered 
corporations are defined based on gross receipts rather than public status, it is 
possible employees would be given these rights in private companies where no 
disclosure is required even to investors, meaning that employees would be 
exercising their votes in the dark.335 
Yet even as the concept of generalized disclosure for stakeholders has 
been abandoned as a regulatory tool, the compromise struck in the 1930s and 
again in the 1970s—disclosure for investors, with benefits experienced by 
society at large—has proven unworkable. In fact, it has amplified the very 
investor-centric orientation of corporate managers that reformers sought to 
combat. 
IV. The Perverse Effects of Using the Securities Laws as an All-Purpose 
Disclosure Vehicle 
Because the securities laws are the only vehicle for generalized public 
disclosure, there is an incentive to load securities filings with information that, 
while potentially of great relevance to society, has minimal relevance to 
investors. This not only may impede investors’ ability to locate and process the 
information they need, but also may distort information of legitimate public 
interest in order to justify its inclusion in securities filings. Finally, by centering 
investors, the securities laws weight the balance of power within the 
corporation in their favor, tilting managerial behavior toward wealth 
maximization, potentially at the expense of other constituencies. 
A. Concealing Motivations for Seeking Disclosure 
The current system is inherently dishonest. Advocates who want 
corporations to disclose information geared toward stakeholder audiences are 
 
334. See, e.g., YOSIFON, supra note 17, at 198-204 (proposing that employees or consumers be 
granted corporate voting rights, but failing to discuss any accompanying change in disclosure regime). 
Kent Greenfield also recommends that workers and other stakeholders be granted a more formal role in 
corporate governance without proposing changes to the mandatory disclosure regime, see GREENFIELD, 
supra note 17, at 148-52, though he does recommend that workers be permitted to sue for fraud if 
management communicates false information, see id. at 215-16. 
335. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). Senator Tammy Baldwin has similarly offered a bill that 
would enfranchise corporate employees, but only in companies that have chosen to list on a stock 
exchange. See S. 2605, 115th Cong. (2018). As a result, employees would necessarily have access to the 
SEC disclosures geared to investor audiences that are triggered by stock exchange listing, but would not, 
in Sen. Baldwin’s proposal, be entitled to any additional disclosures aimed at noninvestor, employee 
audiences. 
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encouraged to conceal their true motives, which by definition inhibits attempts 
to fully communicate both the need for the information, and its significance to 
the broader (noninvestor) community. 
There are two basic avenues available to those who seek greater 
disclosure from public corporations. The first is to persuade the SEC (or 
Congress) to require such disclosure. Because the SEC has taken the position 
that “materiality” refers to information that has economic significance,336 most 
appeals for new rulemaking focus on the relevance of the requested 
information to corporate performance,337 regardless of the advocate’s true 
interest. This, of course, is the reason why the sustainability debate discussed 
above is so contentious. 
The second mechanism is to press for voluntary disclosure, typically by 
submitting a shareholder proposal to the targeted corporation under Exchange 
Act Rule 14a-8.338 That rule permits a sponsoring shareholder to include items 
on the corporate proxy ballot for all shareholders to vote on, and though 
proposals are usually framed as advisory requests to management rather than 
binding commands, corporations typically find it expedient to bow to 
shareholders’ expressed wishes. But Rule 14a-8 has its limits, namely, it cannot 
be used for proposals that would be illegal for managers to implement.339 
Because managers are generally believed to operate under a fiduciary duty to 
maximize shareholder wealth,340 any 14a-8 proposal that explicitly called for 
management to take action based on ethical, rather than business, reasons 
would be on shaky legal ground. Even apart from that concern, the same 
dynamics regarding shareholder priorities discussed in Section II.B are in play. 
Rule 14a-8 proposals cannot succeed unless a critical mass of investors vote in 
favor of them, but because so many investors operate under a mandate—
explicitly or implicitly—to maximize financial returns, appealing to them 
requires that proponents make their case in terms of the financial relevance of 
the information sought. The upshot is that investors who submit 14a-8 
proposals seeking greater corporate disclosure routinely, and fairly 
transparently, misrepresent their motives. 
Consider recent proposals submitted to pharmaceutical companies by the 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, a fund that provides health care plans to 
union members. The Trust sought explanations for the usurious rates often 
 
336. See supra Section II.B. 
337. Choudhury, supra note 170, at 212; Esty & Karpilow, supra note 161, at 671; Ho, supra 
note 161, at 414-23; Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Request for Rulemaking on Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-
730.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BRN-VQJT]. 
338. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019). 
339. Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(2). Additionally, proposals must concern aspects of the business that 
are financially significant. See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(5); SEC Staff Legal Bulletin 14I (Nov. 1, 2017). 
340. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15495 (Apr. 10, 2019). The wealth 
maximization norm is accepted by most commenters, although it continues to generate a substantial 
amount of debate. See YOSIFON, supra note 17, at 60-95. 
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charged for specialty drugs, and justified its proposals on the ground that these 
pricing strategies may anger the public and cause legislative backlash, to the 
ultimate detriment of the companies that employ them.341 But it seems far more 
plausible that the Trust—which must fund medical expenses incurred by its 
beneficiaries—simply wanted to keep drug prices low, and hoped to use both 
the proposal process, and any information generated by it, to publicly shame 
the targeted companies. In this manner, the Trust sought to leverage securities 
disclosure into a mechanism for pressuring drug companies to change their 
behavior.342 
A recent proposal submitted by the Episcopal Church to Anadarko 
Petroleum represents another example. The Church sought to have Anadarko 
report to shareholders on its process for identifying and addressing risks 
associated with human rights violations in its operations, purportedly out of 
concern that litigation, project delays, and reputational damage associated with 
such violations would “adversely affect shareholder value.”343 Though it is 
possible that the Church was simply trying to protect its economic stake in 
Anadarko, a more likely explanation is that—as a humanitarian organization—
its concern was for the people affected by Anadarko’s operations.344 
This is not to criticize the Trust, the Church, or other proponents seeking 
disclosure of social information; it is simply to call attention to a form of 
prevarication that has become so routinized within the securities framework 
that it is treated as unremarkable. But these misrepresentations are not 
harmless; they are disabling. The need to emphasize financial risk and 
shareholder return inhibits a fuller discussion of the societal need for such 
information, let alone a serious balancing of the costs and benefits of requiring 
it. 
The problem extends to academia, as well. With her classic article, The 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 
 
341. See Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 109832, at *2-3 (Feb. 
25, 2015); Gilead Sciences, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 6984699, at *9 (Feb. 23, 2015). 
342. A similar campaign successfully pressured Walmart to stop selling AR-15 rifles. Trinity 
Wall Street, an Episcopal parish and Walmart investor, sought to have shareholders vote on whether 
Walmart should withdraw the guns from its shelves. Walmart argued that the proposal was legally 
improper, leading to a court battle and multiple headlines. Though Walmart succeeded in excluding the 
proposal from the corporate proxy, see Trinity Wall St. v. Walmart Stores, 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015), 
shortly thereafter it voluntarily withdrew the guns from its shelves, see Hiroko Tabuchi, Walmart to End 
Sales of Assault-Style Rifles in U.S. Stores, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/business/walmart-to-end-sales-of-assault-rifles-in-us-stores.html 
[https://perma.cc/YA53-4JUG]. 
343. Anadarko Petroleum, SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6914372, at *6 (Jan. 22, 2014). 
344. The fact that many sponsors of social proposals only hold a nominal stake in the targeted 
company provides further evidence that their concerns stem from their status as members of the 
community rather than as investors. For example, Harrington Investments, a socially responsible fund, 
recently sponsored a proposal that Coca-Cola disclose more information about sugar’s health risks. 
Harrington has $200 million in assets under management, and owns a Coca-Cola stake worth about 
$4900. See Andrea Vittorio, Cola-Cola Faces Shareholder Activism on Sugar’s Health Risks, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X6QGBVIK000000 
[https://perma.cc/7VQM-V7PY]. 
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Cynthia Williams became one of the more prominent advocates for the use of 
the securities laws to force greater social disclosure in the “public interest.”345 
However, the article explicitly advocates disclosure for investor audiences 
only.346 Williams’s explanation for how disclosure to investors advances a 
public interest invokes only an unspecified notion of corporate accountability 
and the right of investors to choose how to allocate their dollars—which, she 
admits, is unlikely to influence corporate behavior.347 The natural implication is 
that social disclosures cannot serve the “public” interest by appealing to 
investors alone, and that, therefore, investors are not the appropriate audience 
at all.348 Yet rather than confront that fact—and the incongruity of using the 
securities laws as the vehicle for such disclosure—she leaves the critical 
question unanswered: What disclosures are needed for the public, distinct from 
investor, interest?349 
In short, securities disclosure has a tail-wagging-the-dog problem: The 
social control that was once a byproduct of the regime has become, for many 
advocates, its central purpose.350 But the securities laws are not designed to 
make business transparent to the general public; they are designed to “provide 
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and 
foreign commerce.”351 The SEC’s mission is not to promote the general 
welfare,352 but to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
 
345. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1235 (1999). 
346. See id. at 1237, 1242, 1284-89, 1294-95. 
347. Id. at 1294. 
348. Id. at 1221 (arguing that the Exchange Act was intended to promote “accountability to 
the public”); see also id. at 1295 (speculating that corporate managers want to avoid having their bad 
acts published in the New York Times). 
349. As described above, it is common for academics to recommend disclosure to investors 
when they envision that the true audience is the general public. See supra Introduction; see also Hill, 
supra note 18, at 978-79. Virginia Harper Ho has argued that sustainability reporting should be 
mandatory because of its importance to investors, yet in her discussion of why companies may be 
disinclined to volunteer it, she highlights that information of significant relevance to society may 
nonetheless be of minimal relevance to the subject company. In this respect, Ho shifts from investor 
audiences to societal audiences without comment. Ho, supra note 161, at 441. Barnali Choudhury makes 
the opposite move, initially recognizing that social disclosures are sought for noninvestor audiences, but 
then recommending they be tailored to investor concerns. Choudhury, supra note 170, at 191, 212. 
350. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 373-74. 
351. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, pmbl., 48 Stat. 74, 74; 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. 
(2018); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2018) (declaring that the Act is “for 
regulation and control” of “transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges 
and over-the-counter markets”). 
352. Cynthia Williams has offered the most in-depth argument that the securities laws 
authorize the SEC to require corporate disclosure solely to serve the public interest, regardless of its 
relevance to financial return (though—as described above—she does not explain how the public interest 
is furthered by social disclosures aimed at an investor audience). Williams points out that the proxy 
provisions in the Exchange Act explicitly reference regulation in the “public interest,” Williams, supra 
note 345, at 1235, which she interprets to mean that disclosures can extend beyond those intended 
specifically for investor protection. At the same time, she concedes that references to the “public 
interest” may be interpreted to mean prohibition of certain kinds of financial practices reviled at the 
time, such as self-dealing, overuse of leverage, and concentration of power among a handful of finance 
professionals. See id. at 1214, 1240, 1245 n.245. 
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markets, and facilitate capital formation.”353 Disclosure demands that rely upon 
the securities laws must therefore be couched in the language of investor 
protection and financial return, no matter how far-fetched the connection. 
B. Producing Less Informative Disclosures 
The failure to systematically grapple with the need for public-interest 
disclosure encourages what can only be described as scattershot disclosure 
requirements, inserted haphazardly into the securities laws whenever Congress 
(or a specific member) latches on to a particular issue. As a result, recent years 
have seen somewhat random disclosure add-ons, such as minor environmental 
liabilities,354 the safety record of mining companies,355 violations of sanctions 
against Iran,356 and the sourcing of certain minerals often obtained from war-
torn areas,357 which are transparently intended more for the general public than 
for shareholders.358 Such proposals are often incoherent on their face. For 
example, the recently introduced DASHBOARD Act proposes that public 
companies disclose information about their use of consumer data in their 
securities filings,359 yet the sponsors explicitly intend the disclosures to be used 
 
 In fact, the Exchange Act’s preamble makes clear that it is “transactions in securities” 
that are “effected with a national public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2018); see also Hillary A. Sale, New 
Public, supra note 59, at 138; Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1049 (2019) 
[hereinafter Disclosure’s Purpose] (discussing how the “public interest” referenced in the Exchange Act 
refers to the general benefits that follow from honest securities markets); Thel, supra note 45, at 389-92. 
Moreover, with respect to proxy voting specifically, the main concern at the time was directors’ 
illegitimate perpetuation of their control through manipulation of, among other things, the proxy 
process, holding company structure, and issuance of nonvoting stock. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From 
Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1189-91 (1993); 
Loomis Jr. & Rubman, supra note 51, at 154-155, 170; RIPLEY, supra note 228, at 77, 85-89, 94-98, 
151, 300-02. 
 That said, as discussed above, prior to the enactment of the Securities Acts, there were 
numerous proposals for general corporate transparency, so it is likely that some of these ideas motivated 
the Acts themselves even if the Acts themselves did not extend as broadly as earlier proposals. 
353. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/X28K-YAP8]. Congress mandated that 
when the SEC engages in rulemaking, it must consider “the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” National Securities Market Improvement 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424. 
354. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5C (2019). 
355. 15 U.S.C. § 78m-2 (2018). 
356. Id. § 78m(r). 
357. Id. § 78m(p). 
358. Other similar types of disclosure items have been proposed. See H.R. 2364, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers to disclose in an annual 
report any substantial financial relationship with any manufacturer or dealer of firearms or 
ammunition.”); H.R. 7089, 115th Cong. (2018) (“A Bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
to require certain companies to disclose information describing any measures the company has taken to 
identify and address conditions of forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and the worst forms of child 
labor within the company’s supply chains.”). 
359. S. 1951, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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by consumers and for antitrust enforcement,360 with little explanation of how 
this information is relevant to an investor audience. (Naturally, because only 
public companies are subject to the requirement, its use as a consumer 
protection and antitrust enforcement tool is limited.)361 Another proposal would 
require publicly traded corporations to disclose political spending not only in 
their securities filings, but also on their corporate website,362 demonstrating that 
the disclosure is not aimed at a purely investor audience. But if that is the case, 
there is no reason it should apply exclusively to publicly traded companies. 
These types of items would almost certainly be more effective if presented 
as part of a systematic report on companies’ overall social performance, with 
different metrics emphasized for different industries. But because there is no 
framework for thinking about social disclosure as part of a general regulatory 
system, advocates are incentivized to slip items targeted to their idiosyncratic 
interests into legislation whenever they can manage it.363 
Moreover, because the information sought is forced through the frame of 
corporate wealth maximization, only the investor-oriented aspects are 
emphasized, potentially distorting it and robbing it of its utility to other 
stakeholders. Steven Bank and George Georgiev demonstrate how this can 
occur in the context of pay ratio disclosures mandated by Dodd-Frank.364 In the 
wake of the financial crisis, Congress required that public companies disclose 
the ratio of CEO pay to median worker pay. The disclosure requirement was 
almost certainly intended as a shaming mechanism to combat income 
inequality,365 but even Congress was not willing to say so forthrightly, creating 
a theoretical muddle for the SEC in designing rules for its implementation.366 
The resulting regulations fail to generate useful information no matter who the 
target audience is perceived to be, and, worse, the information that is disclosed 
is misinterpreted and misused by a variety of stakeholders.367 
It is not unusual for these types of items to stymie the SEC. With respect 
to mineral disclosures, for example, in defending its implementing regulations 
from a subsequent legal challenge, the SEC did not offer even a hypothetical 
justification for why the matter should be material to investors, or how 
 
360. Mark R. Warner, Warner & Hawley Introduce Bill to Force Social Media Companies to 
Disclose How They Are Monetizing User Data (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/6/warner-hawley-introduce-bill-to-force-social-
media-companies-to-disclose-how-they-are-monetizing-user-data [https://perma.cc/3AXE-UYR7]. 
361. The bill also proposes that all companies, both public and private, make certain 
additional disclosures directly to users regarding how their individual data will be used. 
362. See H.R. 1053, 116th Cong. (2019). 
363. Cf. Hill, supra note 18, at 981 (warning that outrage at corporate behavior may be based 
on “fads” rather than principled consideration of appropriate business conduct). 
364. Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure as Soundbite: The Case of 
CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1138-39 (2019). 
365. Id. at 1140, 1148-1150; Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 378. 
366. Bank & Georgiev, supra note 364, at 1138-39. 
367. Id. at 1151-63, 1182-83. 
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disclosure could advance any public policy.368 In the absence of a serious 
defense, the D.C. Circuit struck part of the regulation as inconsistent with the 
First Amendment.369 
C. Privileging Investors and Wealth Maximization 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the current system is inherently unstable. 
When investors are the sole intended audience of corporate disclosure, they 
have a unique, governmentally conferred advantage over the general public in 
influencing corporate behavior. Securities disclosure makes it easier for 
independent directors—less beholden to corporate management, and more 
beholden to shareholders—to monitor management performance, resulting in 
“an increasing orientation of the corporate purpose toward shareholder wealth 
maximization.”370 Meanwhile, other stakeholders’ ability to condition 
corporate success on accommodation of their own interests is weakened. The 
result is that managerial incentives are misaligned: Managers are encouraged to 
favor investors to the detriment of other constituencies. The disclosure 
compromise falls apart. The more that investor interests and stakeholder 
interests diverge—and the more that investors are favored—the greater the 
calls for new mechanisms of corporate control, including new types of 
disclosure,371 that can be used to counter investors’ influence. 
This is especially true when it comes to private companies. As mandatory 
securities disclosures multiply, more companies choose to delay a public 
offering or transition to private status rather than bear the costs of public 
reporting.372 The tools of social control are weakened further, resulting—
ironically—in more proposals for disclosures that would only burden public 
companies, creating another unsustainable cycle. But if all companies were 
required to issue a basic disclosure package regardless of their mechanisms for 
 
368. See Brief of Respondent, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252, 2014 WL 6901084 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 2014); Brief of Respondent, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252., 2013 WL 
5756165 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2013). When issuing its regulations, the SEC candidly admitted that the 
statute’s objectives “appear to be directed at achieving overall social benefits and are not necessarily 
intended to generate measurable, direct economic benefits to investors or issuers specifically. 
Additionally, the social benefits are quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits 
that our rules ordinarily strive to achieve.” Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 77 
Fed. Reg. 56,350 (Sept. 12, 2012). 
369. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 524, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
370. Gordon, supra note 13, at 1540; see also Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 
79 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402486 [https://perma.cc/4ZAD-PC5H] 
(describing how securities disclosures permit shareholders to force management to focus on wealth 
maximization at the expense of other constituencies). 
371. Hence the sustainability debate, and the various proposals for specific types of social 
disclosures described above. 
372. Fontenay, supra note 119, at 448; Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-inequity/570808 
[https://perma.cc/H7VU-Q8TZ]. 
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raising capital, the incremental costs of going public would be reduced, which 
would stabilize the system (and encourage more public offerings).373 
There is another unsettling side effect of relying on securities disclosures 
to inform the general public about corporate behavior. By reducing broader 
social issues to their impact on shareholders, we risk contributing to a discourse 
that suggests that investors are the only members of society who matter. Daniel 
Hemel and Dorothy Lund dub this “discursive harm,” and, in the context of 
sexual harassment, raise the possibility that treating it as a corporate 
governance issue “runs the risk of equating the negative economic externalities 
of sexual harassment with the human tragedy that victims endure.”374 These 
effects are not harmless; for example, focusing on the business case for 
diversity rather than its moral justice may reinforce negative stereotyping.375 
Making matters worse, because the securities laws define materiality and 
harm in terms of financial impact, there is no penalty when companies disclose 
false information about their sustainability. The noninvestor audiences who 
rely on such information have few remedies,376 and investors may not be 
entitled to damages unless they can establish its financial relevance,377 which 
may not be possible for some kinds of social information. Not only does this 
render ethical investment a legally unrecognized and unprotected category,378 
but it also incentivizes issuers to “greenwash,” thereby actively undermining 
 
373. Cf. Cyrus Aghamolla & Richard T. Thakor, Do Mandatory Disclosure Requirements for 
Private Firms Increase the Propensity of Going Public? (July 29, 2019) (unpublished article), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428780 [https://perma.cc/QE84-QPW5] (finding that firms affected by a new 
FDA requirement to publicly disclose clinical trials were more likely to transition from private to public 
status). 
374. Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1583, 1671 (2018). 
375. Jamillah Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates vs. Corporate Interests, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 1473 (2017); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 
854 (arguing that the business case for diversity “may lead to the overextension, the marginalization, 
and even the devaluation of people of color”). 
376. GREENFIELD, supra note 17, at 187-89; Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 289-92 (2014); 
Velikonja, supra note 54, at 1951-54. But see Nate Raymond, Massachusetts Top Court Rules Against 
Exxon in Climate Change Probe, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-
mobil-climatechange/massachusetts-top-court-rules-against-exxon-in-climate-change-probe-
idUSKBN1HK20M [https://perma.cc/954S-QACP] (describing a lawsuit by the Massachusetts Attorney 
General alleging that Exxon lied to consumers about climate change). 
377. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 112-23 (2017). Recently, 
New York State lost its bid to hold Exxon liable for false climate change disclosures because the state 
was unable to prove that investors, specifically, would have been misled. See John Schwartz, New York 
Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-new-york.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4UP-65WY]. 
378. To some extent, it may even be actively disdained by courts. See id. at 133. 
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attempts by the public to use corporate disclosures as a rallying point to spur 
change.379 
V. Thinking About Reform 
In the past, efforts to force corporate disclosure for the benefit of 
stakeholder audiences were subverted by arguments that it was unnecessary; 
disclosure directly to investors, and to regulators, would be sufficient for most 
purposes. Where it was not, it could be supplemented by specific, targeted 
disclosures to particular audiences as the need arose (such as product-specific, 
consumer-oriented disclosures at the point of sale, or details about workplace 
hazards at individual sites). Yet the continuing salience of this issue 
demonstrates that these arguments were in error; stakeholders have identifiable 
needs that are best served by a generalized disclosure system designed for their 
interests. 
Though many companies voluntarily issue sustainability reports to 
stakeholders,380 and even private companies may choose to share limited 
economic information with the public (in response to scandal or otherwise),381 
these are demonstrably insufficient to satisfy public demand. Voluntary 
reporting is notoriously incomplete and inconsistent,382 and the lack of legal 
mandate gives companies every incentive to make their disclosures as anodyne 
as possible. Illustrating the point, the law firm of Mayer Brown recently issued 
 
379. Case, supra note 70, at 395 (“greenwashing” causes public to distrust voluntary 
environmental reporting and diminishes incentives for companies to report truthfully); Cherry, supra 
note 376, at 289; Fisch, supra note 161, at 948. 
380. Ho & Park, supra note 169, at 258; Fisch, supra note 161, at 944-46; Case, supra note 
70, at 395-401. 
381. Hillary Sale argues that companies voluntarily disclose information as a condition of 
maintaining their social legitimacy. For example, before it formally adopted public-company status, 
Uber voluntarily disclosed both financial data and a private report on its internal governance 
deficiencies in response to various scandals. Sale, Social License, supra note 20, at 24-41. Yet Uber’s 
actions do not establish that regulation is unnecessary: Uber’s disclosures came after much of the harm 
had been done, and of course, society’s interests include, but extend beyond, open lawbreaking. 
Moreover, Uber’s newfound transparency did not extend to the details of its governance structure; even 
after these disclosures, news reports were still forced to speculate on how power was allocated within 
the company. See Katie Benner, How Uber’s Chief Is Gaining Even More Clout in the Company, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/technology/uber-chief-travis-kalanick-
stock-buyback.html [https://perma.cc/7TNL-GWUA] (relying on a privately obtained buyback 
agreement to estimate the voting power of Travis Kalanick, Uber’s founder); Julie Bort, Here’s How 
Much Uber Stock Ousted CEO Travis Kalanick Actually Controls, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-uber-stock-travis-kalanick-controls-2017-8 
[https://perma.cc/E9GA-WP8D] (reporting that until revealed in a lawsuit, Kalanick’s voting power was 
unclear). Nor can we rely on scandals to force transparency: the news is littered with instances of private 
company abuses of power that do not result in additional disclosures of internal operations. See, e.g., 
Alan Feuer, Hobby Lobby Agrees to Forfeit 5,500 Artifacts Smuggled Out of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion/hobby-lobby-artifacts-smuggle-iraq.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FZG-CUHM]; Maddy Sauer & Megan Chuchmach, Scandal-Ridden Blackwater 
Changes Name, ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Blackwater 
/story?id=6873331 [https://perma.cc/6VRL-7DSC]. 
382. Case, supra note 70, at 395; Choudhury, supra note 170, at 211; Fisch, supra note 161, at 
947-52; Ho & Park, supra note 169, at 266-68. 
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a client recommendation that voluntary ESG disclosures be “carefully drafted” 
so that “aspirational efforts” are not “presented as formal commitments.”383 
If there are any doubts that a mandatory—rather than voluntary—
disclosure system is required, one need look no further than similar debates in 
the context of securities regulation,384 and then imagine a far less cohesive 
audience. Businesses have many private incentives to conceal information even 
from investors, a group with powerful and uniform interests upon whom they 
depend. Among other things, businesses may wish to use inside information to 
extract rents, and may fear handing advantages to competitors. Collective 
action problems prevent dispersed investors from bargaining for the 
information they need. Meanwhile, mandatory regimes help assuage business 
concerns that they will be disadvantaged relative to peers, and can standardize 
both the types of disclosure and their format in order to facilitate cross-
company comparisons.385 
The disclosures recommended here present far greater problems of 
coordination and consistency than do those geared to investors. The target 
audiences are not only spread more widely with far more varied needs, but 
many are not in market relationships with the disclosing companies, inhibiting 
their ability to bargain for information directly.386 This point is implicitly 
recognized in the securities literature, where the fact that disclosures targeted to 
investors necessarily provide benefits to the rest of society is touted as a strong 
justification for mandatory reporting.387 Or, to put it another way, there is one 
mechanism for reconciling the interests of multiple constituencies with diverse 
priorities who are dispersed across society as a whole: government regulation. 
Therefore, we need to talk seriously about designing a system of 
disclosure for noninvestor audiences. Below is a proposed outline of how such 
a system might work, and a discussion of potential objections. 
A. Designing the System 
1. Requirements and Administration 
As described above, the European Union has instituted certain corporate 
reporting for stakeholder audiences; the regime proposed here takes the 
 




384. Fox, supra note 279, at 1340; Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, supra note 352, at 1050. 
385. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 376. 
386. Case, supra note 70, at 420 (discussing the difficulty of coordinating constituencies 
affected by harmful behavior who number in the thousands or millions and are spread across multiple 
political jurisdictions). 
387. Fox, supra note 279, at 1358-59. 
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European system both as a model and as a point of contrast. The EU draws a 
distinction between social and financial reporting. Whereas all limited liability 
companies are required to disclose some information about their finances (with 
obligations increasing as the company scales up in size),388 only large 
companies designated as “public-interest entities” must issue sustainability 
reports aimed at a noninvestor audience.389 These “public-interest entities” are 
mostly publicly traded businesses listed on local stock exchanges,390 and 
though some countries have required sustainability reporting even of unlisted 
companies,391 the result is that, globally, reporting on social performance 
intended for a noninvestor audience is still conditioned, to some extent, on the 
presence of widespread public investment.392 
This Article proposes reporting requirements that are both more and less 
expansive. To begin, this Article does not recommend generalized disclosure 
from the smallest companies because they are unlikely to have the kind of 
impact that creates a need for disclosure-based social control. Larger 
companies could be subject to scaled disclosures depending on size,393 taking 
into account gross receipts, number of employees, asset values, or some 
combination of the three. By these measures, disclosure would likely not be 
required until receipts or assets reached into hundreds of millions of dollars, or 
number of employees reached into the hundreds.394 Thus, unlike in Europe, the 
vast majority of American businesses would be exempt; only the largest 20,000 
U.S. firms have more than $100 million in annual revenues.395 These top firms 
would be the most obvious candidates for some degree of mandatory 
 
388. See Bernard et al., supra note 3, at 96-98. 
389. See Directive 2014, supra note 4; see also Global Reporting Initiative, Member State 
Implementation of Directive 2014/95/EU, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary 
/NFRpublication%20online_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU3A-6VTU] (explaining how the directive 
has been implemented at various countries). 
390. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Non-Financial Reporting, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-301_en.htm [https://perma.cc/W7FB-XRB2]; see also Afra Afsharipour, Redefining 
Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465, 487 (2017) (India 
requires sustainability reporting of the largest publicly traded entities). 
391. See Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 389. 
392. Additional public disclosure requirements for particular areas of interest—such as pay 
transparency and environmental performance—may be imposed country by country. See, e.g., 
Workplace Gender Equality Agency, GOV’T OF AUSTL., International Gender Equality Reporting 
Schemes (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.wgea.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2019-04-
4%20International%20reporting%20schemes_Final_for_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/84NW-QUVS]; 
Case, supra note 70, at 402. 
393. Reporting burdens under the federal securities laws are lessened for smaller companies. 
17 C.F.R. § 229.10(f) (2019). 
394. Size might also be measured based on importance to local economies. 
395. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., Firm Size Data, https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/firm-size-
data. There might be complications associated with defining a single firm. Because large companies 
may include smaller subsidiaries, some degree of line-drawing might be necessary to identify which 
firms have reporting obligations and how far they extend. The administering entity might create rules for 
joint reporting within corporate groups, so long as all required information is disclosed, as is done under 
European law. Directive 2014, supra note 4. 
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stakeholder reporting. (By contrast, there are fewer than 4,000 publicly 
reporting firms listed on U.S. exchanges today.)396 
At the same time, the notion that stakeholder reporting should be tied to 
public investment is precisely the problem that this Article identifies. For that 
reason, unlike in the EU, both social and financial information would be 
required of companies meeting the size threshold, regardless of whether their 
securities are available for generalized trading. 
The general criticism of stakeholder-oriented disclosure is that it is too 
unconstrained; there are potentially hundreds of areas of interest.397 Yet in 
truth, most calls for stakeholder disclosure hinge on a few basic categories of 
information. These are financial information (including issues pertaining to tax 
payments, anticorruption measures, and antitrust compliance), corporate 
governance, environmental impact, labor relationships (including diversity, 
working conditions, and pay practices), political activity, and customer 
protection (transparency, safety, privacy).398 A working framework for 
stakeholder disclosure could begin with these topics and make appropriate 
adjustments as experience dictates. 
To minimize burdens on business, the initial system could focus on 
information that has already been compiled internally, such as reports that 
companies are already required to file with government agencies,399 or 
financial and governance information likely to be on hand.400 Doing so would 
spare companies the additional burdens of data gathering, and would go a long 
way toward standardization. Just by way of example, at the federal level, 
companies must disclose diversity information to the EEOC,401 environmental 
information to EPA,402 workplace hazard and injury information to OSHA and 
to employees,403 and hazardous product information to the Consumer Product 
 
396. Editorial, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone? BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-09/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-
gone [https://perma.cc/S4GM-U6P9]. 
397. Elliott J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 BUS. LAW. 575 (1979); 
Staff Report, supra note 129, at 275. 
398. There are several privately developed frameworks for voluntary stakeholder-oriented 
disclosure, Susan Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG Integration, 90 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 731, 772-78 (2019), and these represent the basic categories of information. See, e.g., 
Global Reporting Initiative, Standards Download Center, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center [https://perma.cc/RT5C-
ZHRH]. They are also recurring topics in shareholder proposal activity. 
399. Estlund, supra note 69, at 396-97 (recommending disclosure to employees based in part 
on information already filed with regulators). 
400. Many companies are subject to extensive regulation and keep detailed records of their 
activities for compliance purposes. 
401. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2019). 
402. 40 C.F.R § 704 (2019); Case, supra note 70, at 384. 
403. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1904.7, 1904.39, 1910.1200 (2019). 
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Safety Commission and FDA.404 These disclosures, and others in the same 
vein, could be summarized and compiled into a single report.405 
Public companies, of course, necessarily report financial information and 
are under a legal obligation to keep accurate books and records,406 and 
privately held companies of the size contemplated here are certain to keep 
detailed accounts, and may even voluntarily report such information to their 
investors.407 These internal financial records likely track donations to political 
organizations and lobbying expenditures, all of which could also be reported 
publicly. Finally, companies collect and disclose financial information to the 
IRS. There is a rich literature devoted to the question whether corporate tax 
returns should be made public,408 and without wading too far into that debate, it 
would be a relatively simple matter for corporations to disclose basic 
information like cash taxes paid and effective tax rates, which today are 
difficult to discern even from public company SEC filings.409 
Burdens could also be minimized by distinguishing between companies 
that already file disclosure documents with the SEC, and those that do not. 
Companies subject to securities disclosure requirements could incorporate 
those filings by reference into their stakeholder-oriented disclosures, thus 
avoiding unnecessary duplication.410 Privately held companies would file more 
complete reports, including basic organizational and financial data such as 
governance structure, income statements, balance sheets, business segments, 
 
404. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.6 (2019); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80, 803 (2019). 
405. In some cases, this information may be reported to authorities in a fragmented fashion 
that, in raw form, may not be of much use to stakeholders, see Ho, supra note 161, at 452, but it is 
unlikely that simply aggregating data previously reported (such as firm-level aggregation of emissions 
data reported on a facility-by-facility basis) would impose many additional burdens on disclosing 
companies. 
 There are arguments that some of these reports would be useless to a generalized 
audience. For example, advocates have sought EEO-1 reports for years, see RALPH NADER ET AL., supra 
note 278, at 150; Williams, supra note 28, at 1690; and have been met with the objection that the reports 
do not contain sufficient data to make appropriate comparisons across firms. Weiss, supra note 397, at 
600-01; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC (NRDC III), 606 F.2d 1031, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This 
objection is not entirely persuasive because no one is proposing the EEO-1 reports be disclosed in a 
vacuum; they would necessarily be accompanied by more robust disclosures about firm operations and 
peer companies, which would perhaps make comparisons easier. In any event, these are precisely the 
kinds of judgments a specialized agency could make when developing an initial disclosure framework. 
406. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018). 
407. Fan, supra note 6, at 605-06. 
408. See Blank, supra note 110, at 48-57 (summarizing the arguments). 
409. Id. at 46; see also Allan Sloan, A Simple Tweak Could Tell Us How Much Tax America’s 
Largest Companies Actually Pay, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2010), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-simple-tweak-could-tell-us-how-much-tax-
americas-largest-companies-actually-pay/2020/01/15/5a53ad78-37d1-11ea-bf30-ad313e4ec754 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/AE2W-9DBB]; Nicola M. White, Companies, Investors Pan Planned 
Income Tax Disclosures, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financial-
accounting/companies-investors-pan-planned-income-tax-disclosures [https://perma.cc/685U-HQQB]. 
410. This is a common mechanism for federal securities reporting; companies that disclose 
information in one filing may often incorporate by reference into another filing. 
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and geographic areas of operation, with smaller companies subject to 
correspondingly lighter burdens.411 
Any such system would likely inspire objections that such data includes 
trade secrets or that disclosure would otherwise put disclosing companies at a 
competitive disadvantage. To some extent, this is a feature, not a bug; the 
securities laws already force disclosures that benefit competitors, and this is 
generally lauded so long as the effects are limited in scope.412 That said, these 
are precisely the kinds of judgments that regulators could make when deciding 
what information to publicize.413 
The next issue concerns the appropriate regulator for such a system. This 
is likely a job for the federal government, rather than state regulators, if only to 
prevent the same “race to the bottom” that inspired the call for federal 
chartering and, eventually, a national securities disclosure system.414 Moreover, 
disclosure about isolated operations in particular localities would fail to paint a 
complete portrait of company behavior at the corporate level.415 
There is currently no federal agency with the skills to manage the system 
contemplated here. The SEC is not equipped to manage disclosures intended 
for noninvestors (which is another reason the securities laws should not be used 
for that purpose).416 The Federal Trade Commission has broad experience 
studying business activity, but has fewer disclosure mandates. That said, the 
SEC and the FTC both have skills and experience that would be useful in 
developing a new system. Both study a wide range of industries, and the SEC 
in particular has expertise in developing standardized reporting for public 
audiences, balanced against the costs to businesses of complying with 
disclosure demands. Therefore, it might be appropriate to create a joint 
initiative that draws on the resources and knowledge of both agencies. The 
initiative could begin its work by studying how public information about 
corporations is used by noninvestor audiences, including surveying local 
regulators, as well as advocacy and trade groups, for their input as to how 
existing disclosures are used and the weaknesses in the current system. Based 
on the results of this survey, the initiative could develop a standardized 
 
411. Though private companies of the size contemplated here may already employ an 
independent auditor, the rules could specify that audited financial statements are not necessary unless 
already in the company’s possession. There are several similar requirements in the federal securities 
laws. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(1) (2019). Among European firms, there is evidence that 
companies strategically try to avoid triggering public disclosure requirements in order to avoid the 
additional costs of an audit. See Bernard et al., supra note 3, at 106. 
412. See supra Section I.A. 
413. SEC rules, for example, currently permit issuers to withhold certain information that 
would “affect adversely the registrant’s competitive position.” Regulation S-K, Item 101(c)(ii), 17 
C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (2019). 
414. SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 45. 
415. See Ho, supra note 161, at 452 (arguing that facility-by-facility environmental 
disclosures do not present a holistic portrait of company performance). 
416. Staff Report, supra note 129, at 321-23; Dombalagian, supra note 151, at 682 n.157; 
Guttentag, supra note 151, at 194-95; Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 5, at 374. 
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framework that would permit meaningful comparisons across reporting 
companies. 
2. Enforcement 
One of the weaknesses of the current disclosure system is that unless a 
specific statement can be proved to impact security prices, there are few 
penalties for false reporting.417 A system of stakeholder-oriented corporate 
disclosure has the potential to carry with it a more robust enforcement 
mechanism. 
The private enforcement mechanisms of the securities laws have come 
under heavy fire for encouraging strike suits418 and inflated damages 
calculations.419 To avoid replicating these pathologies, a system of stakeholder-
oriented disclosure could rely on agency enforcement and statutory penalties, 
perhaps supplemented by qui tam actions (which have been recommended in 
the securities context)420. This would allow Congress to tailor appropriate 
remedies and avoid the knotty problem of calculating actual damages, which 
may be unascertainable in this context. Notably, if disclosure obligations 
piggyback on existing reporting requirements, some of the enforcement heavy-
lifting may already be accomplished by other regulatory regimes. 
One lingering issue concerns how these disclosures would fit into the 
existing scheme of securities enforcement. Especially for publicly traded 
companies, any public statement could theoretically form the basis of a fraud-
on-the-market securities class action, even statements—such as the disclosures 
contemplated here—that are aimed at a noninvestor audience.421 One can easily 
imagine a scenario where a company discloses information not required under 
the federal securities laws, and yet, if it later turns out to be false, investors 
claim that the information impacted the market price of the stock. Companies 
may well balk at the prospect of mandated disclosures that expose them to 
additional securities fraud liability. 
Yet the problem is perhaps more theoretical than real. Information that is 
material to investors should already be included in the federal securities filings 
of public companies; the disclosures contemplated here would, almost as a 
matter of law, be immaterial and courts can swiftly make that determination.422 
 
417. See Section IV.C, supra. 
418. Adam Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
27 (2015). 
419. Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 639 (1996). 
420. Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program 
Changes the Securities Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235 (2014). 
421. Ann M. Lipton, Fact or Fiction: Flawed Approaches to Evaluating Market Behavior in 
Securities Litigation, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 741 (discussing how documents aimed at noninvestors can 
nonetheless form the basis of a securities fraud lawsuit). 
422. Id. at 745-48 (describing the aggressiveness with which courts dismiss securities lawsuits 
on materiality grounds). Moreover, if the SEC is involved in designing the disclosure system, it can 
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The risk is greater for nonpublic companies which have few or no federal 
disclosure obligations; for that reason, new disclosures may well be material to 
investors. That said, nonpublic companies are unlikely to be targets of fraud-
on-the-market class actions,423 and if individual investors can prove that they 
relied upon, and were harmed by, the company’s intentional false 
representations,424 it is not troubling that disclosing companies would be 
subject to liability. 
B. Potential Objections 
1. The Limits of Disclosure 
Disclosure is often proposed as a solution to intractable problems because 
it is easy and less controversial than more robust regulatory interventions, and 
it is derided for the same reasons.425 Critics point out that whether due to herd 
behavior or cognitive limitations, individual actors often cannot digest and 
apply the reams of information they are given.426 Disclosure thus “give[s] the 
appearance of ‘doing something’” without actually limiting predatory or 
harmful practices.427 
The disclosure recommended here, however, is not intended as a 
substitute for more robust regulation, but as a complement to it. Businesses 
often have inherent advantages over regulators; they have more concentrated 
resources, and are constantly evolving to evade formal restrictions on their 
behavior. Information collection is a first, and necessary, step in developing 
effective regulation, and public disclosure allows other constituencies to aid 
regulators in assimilating the information they are given. 
Moreover, a system of stakeholder disclosure would not be intended to 
inform consumers and other market actors at the point of purchase, which is 
exactly the type of disclosure where cognitive limitations may undermine 
effectiveness. These disclosures are intended to be used for data analysis and 
organizing, so that interested and sophisticated actors—intermediaries such as 
journalists, academics, and advocacy groups—may interpret and disseminate 
 
ensure harmonization so that information likely to be material to public company investors is included 
within the securities disclosure framework. 
423. The fraud-on-the-market doctrine only applies to companies whose securities trade in 
“open and developed” markets, Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), and is generally blamed for 
the prevalence of securities “strike” suits. See Pritchard, supra note 418, at 28. 
424. Outside of a few highly specific contexts, scienter is a required element of claims based 
on false statements in connection with securities transactions. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976). 
425. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 682; Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, 
The Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 605 (2013). 
426. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 25, at 686-87; Davidoff & Hill, supra note 425, at 
622. 
427. Davidoff & Hill, supra note 425, at 604. 
10. LIPTON ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  10:13 AM 
Not Everything Is About Investors 
569 
 
information in more digestible form. Such disclosures can be very effective for 
educating the public and pressuring organizations to improve their behavior.428 
2. Unintended Consequences 
Poorly designed disclosure can do more harm than good.429 Most 
obviously, disclosure may have anticompetitive effects. It could facilitate 
coordination among competing firms and thereby encourage the formation of 
cartels, to the detriment of consumers and other market actors. Or disclosure 
may discourage innovation to the extent that disclosing firms believe that they 
must share their intellectual property with competitors. 
There is some evidence for these effects;430 for example, mandatory 
disclosures may be associated with reduced R&D spending and product 
releases.431 But these narrow data points must be balanced against the more 
general anticompetitive effects of unbridled corporate power. There is reason to 
believe, for example, that the European economy has become more 
competitive, while the U.S. economy has become less so, in part due to the 
ability of large American companies to manipulate the regulatory system.432 A 
focus on microincentives at the firm level is penny-wise and pound-foolish to 
the extent it overlooks the collective advantage that secrecy confers on 
corporations over those who seek to cabin their power. 
An additional concern may be that, rather than encourage best 
practices,433 disclosure may create a “race to the bottom,” allowing an industry 
to settle on suboptimal norms by benchmarking poor practices against each 
 
428. Numerous authors have described how intermediaries can help the public interpret 
complex information that is, or could be, disclosed under government mandate. Blank, supra note 110, 
at 56 (corporate tax information); Case, supra note 70, at 393 (environmental performance); Dalley, 
supra note 76, at 1125; Estlund, supra note 69, at 377-78 (workplace information). As described above, 
the internet makes the services of such information intermediaries more powerful and effective. 
429. Dalley, supra note 76, at 1127-28 (describing how disclosure may backfire, encouraging 
actors to game the system). 
430. John Kepler, Private Communication Among Competitors (Nov. 12, 2018) (unpublished 
article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269911 [https://perma.cc/8LG4-UPS8]. On the other hand, the fact 
that firms try to avoid triggering mandatory disclosures in Europe suggests they fear increased 
competition, and do not welcome disclosure for purposes of cartelization. See Bernard et al., supra note 
3, at 109. There is some evidence that firms are more likely to disclose information publicly when they 
have fewer incentives to compete, suggesting again that they view disclosure, on average, as handing 
advantages to competitors rather than providing shared benefits. See Ian D. Gow et al., Non-Answers 
During Conference Calls (Chi. Booth Research Paper No. 19-01, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310360 [https://perma.cc/4X2A-QKXE]; Jihwon Park et al., Disclosure 
Incentives When Competing Firms Have Common Ownership, 67 J. ACCT. & ECON. 387 (2019). 
431. See Matthias Breuer et al., Mandated Financial Reporting and Corporate Innovation 
(Sept. 7, 2019) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3449813 [https://perma.cc/4RLJ-5W75]. 
Pharmaceutical firms that go public, for example, tend to initiate fewer projects. This effect may be due 
simply to the pressures of a public shareholder base, but one study concluded that forced disclosure may 
also play a role. See Aghamolla & Thakor, supra note 373. 
432. See THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL 9, 97, 106-09, 122-23, 174-75, 203 
(2019). 
433. Branson, supra note 313, at 652-53 (arguing that disclosure of social information will 
positively influence peer companies). 
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other.434 For example, if a certain number of employees triggers disclosure 
obligations, firms may choose to hire contractors, thereby depriving potential 
workers of the legal benefits and protections they would have as direct 
employees.435 
These administrative challenges are real, but they do not suggest that the 
answer is to keep the system as it is, where firms can opt in or out, often at will. 
The trick is simply finding the right regulatory balance. A robust joint 
employer test, for example, may make it harder for firms to artificially evade 
reporting obligations. It will remain the responsibility of the administering 
agencies to evaluate whether the costs and risks associated with specific 
disclosures are likely to outweigh the benefits. The SEC has been weighing 
these types of concerns for decades;436 there is no reason why the joint task 
force recommended here should not be able to continue that work, especially if 
it adopts an incremental, flexible, and experimental approach. And the fact that 
other countries have been able to develop systems of stakeholder-oriented 
disclosure establishes their feasibility. 
3. Constitutional Concerns 
It is very likely that a disclosure system of the kind advocated here would 
be challenged as a form of prohibited compelled speech under the First 
Amendment, or as an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.437 A 
 
434. This has been a complaint in the context of disclosure of CEO pay under Dodd-Frank, 
see Davidoff & Hill, supra note 425, at 624, and is one of the arguments against robust disclosure in 
other areas, see Blank, supra note 110, at 62-69 (tax); Estlund, supra note 69, at 365 n.46 (wages); 
Williams, supra note 28, at 1731 (diversity). 
435. One study of mandatory disclosure in Europe found that some private firms incur 
significant costs to manage their asset values and thereby avoid triggering disclosure obligations. See 
Bernard et al., supra note 3, at 107, 110; see also Jeffrey L. Hoopes et al, Public Tax-Return Disclosure 
14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24318, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24318 [https://perma.cc/832C-YECF] (manipulation of size in Australia 
to avoid disclosure of tax information). 
436. For example, the SEC addresses concerns about proprietary information by permitting 
redactions of confidential material. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, New Rules and Procedures for 
Exhibits Containing Immaterial, Competitively Harmful Information (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/new-rules-and-procedures-exhibits-containing-immaterial 
[https://perma.cc/2FRR-TEB7]. 
437. It is not clear that informational disclosures filed with a regulatory agency and 
subsequently made available to the public should be categorized as speech-based regulation subject to 
First Amendment scrutiny in the first place. Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the 
Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 474 (2016); Robert H. Post, Compelled Commercial 
Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 880-81 (2015). Assuming that they are, the disclosure system would 
need to overcome objections that it is designed merely to satisfy the public’s “idle curiosity.” Am. Meat 
Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); see also Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. 
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); Adler, supra, at 468. There may also be objections that 
compelled disclosure of sustainability information amounts to a mandatory self-condemnation, which 
has also been held to violate the First Amendment. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Rebecca Susko, The First Amendment Implications of a Mandatory Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Disclosure Regime, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10989, 10996 
(2018). 
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full accounting of the constitutional arguments is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but lurking in the background of both constitutional objections lies a 
broader theoretical question regarding the nature of the firm itself, and on 
whose behalf it should be run. 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has come close to constitutionalizing a 
stockholder-centric view of the firm,438 but this is a contestable position. As 
explained above, though all would agree that in a broad sense, firms exist to 
benefit society as a whole,439 a battle has long raged over whether this is best 
accomplished if firms are managed with a view to benefit equity owners—the 
stockholders—or whether they should be managed at the outset with a view to 
benefitting all of their stakeholders, including investors, creditors, employees, 
and consumers.440 Stockholders may be viewed as “owners” of the firm, with 
the concomitant right to direct corporate behavior,441 or they may be viewed as 
simply one of many types of claimants on corporate assets, with no particular 
privileged position in the corporate hierarchy.442 
This matters because the constitutionality of the disclosures required by 
the federal securities laws is (usually) unquestioned.443 If investors—and 
specifically, stockholders—have no more exalted position than any other 
corporate stakeholder, then it is easier to justify imposing a disclosure 
framework intended to satisfy the informational needs of other corporate 
constituencies.444 Certainly if, for example, Elizabeth Warren’s proposal for 
employee suffrage were to pass into law, it would be difficult to deny 
employees’ need for information targeted to their concerns. Even without that 
 
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, though business owners have a protectable privacy 
interest in business records, City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), documents may be 
sought “in respect to general or statistical investigations authorized by Congress,” Okla. Press. Pub. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). Occasionally courts deem regulatory disclosure requirements to be 
overly burdensome. Airbnb v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp. 3d 467 (2019). 
438. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“Shareholders can determine whether 
their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits”); Haan, supra 
note 91, at 2679-80; Pollman, supra note 216, at 690. 
439. See supra  Introduction. 
440. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 220-222. 
441. Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law (July 16, 2019) (unpublished 
article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3421009 [https://perma.cc/A4S8-WH5P]. 
442. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 601, 604-05 (2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad 
Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 483-84. 
443. But see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995). 
444. This is particularly so because the securities laws are aimed not only at stockholders, but 
also bondholders. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). Even as a theoretical matter, 
bondholders have never been elevated above other corporate constituencies such as employees. 
Managers usually owe fiduciary duties to equity holders (though not always, see, for example, 6 Del. 
Code. § 18-1104), but rarely do so for bondholders, see Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). Meanwhile, it has been argued that employers do owe fiduciary 
duties to workers who are not the targets of any system of generalized disclosure. Matthew T. Bodie, 
Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 (2017). 
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kind of formal role in the corporate governance structure, employees, 
consumers, and other stakeholders are critical to firm operations, and thereby 
may be said to have a claim of equal dignity with respect to corporate 
information to that of purchasers of firm securities. 
VI. Conclusion 
A century’s worth of demands for corporate transparency has been 
repeatedly derailed with the argument that only investors, and not public 
audiences, need information. Today’s economic environment belies that claim. 
Massive, socially impactful companies may do very well by their shareholders, 
but by operating out of the public eye, they can do significant harm to their 
employees, customers, and competitors. More generally, their privacy impedes 
our ability to understand our social and industrial landscape, and to shape it to 
better serve our communities. 
Rather than warp the securities laws to serve purposes for which they 
were never intended, we should focus our efforts on developing a system of 
corporate transparency tailored to the needs of all stakeholders. In so doing, we 
can make disclosures more useful to all audiences—investors and the public 
alike—without imposing piecemeal, collectively burdensome obligations on 
disclosing companies. At the very least, there should be a national conversation 
about the informational needs of the public, and the systemic informational 
deficits created by the investor-oriented disclosure system we have today. 
 
